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I. INTRODUCTION
Progress in the scientific techniques of genetic engineering1 has
sparked unprecedented interest in industrial applications2 using living or-
ganisms.' Scientists have developed techniques that use human tissue to
produce commercial products.4 These biotechnology products carry
great potential for treating many human diseases,5 including, possibly,
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). In response to this in-
creased interest in biotechnology products, many biotechnology firms
have been formed with the goal of commercially exploiting biotechnol-
ogy techniques for profit. Consequently, companies are battling over
1. See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of genetic engineering.
2. Industrial applications include the production of new drugs, food, and chemicals, the
degradation of toxic wastes, and the improvement of agricultural products. OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BA-218, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 3 (1984) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY].
3. Id.
4. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BA-337, NEW DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE AND CELLS 23 (1987) [here-
inafter OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE].
5. See id. at 45.
6. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 3. Private sector investment to com-
mercialize biotechnology products exceeded one billion dollars in 1983 alone. Id. In addition,
there are currently approximately 100 commercial biotechnology companies developing
human therapeutic products. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 56.
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the enormous potential profits these products may generate.7
In 1980, two landmark events accelerated industry-sponsored re-
search in human tissue and cells.' First, the United States Supreme
Court, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,9 held that human-made life forms are
patentable.10 After Chakrabarty, scientists have been able to patent de-
veloped tissue.11 Second, Congress passed the Patent and Trademark
Amendment Act12 with the objective of commercializing government-
sponsored inventions." This act encourages patenting inventions which
result from government-sponsored projects. 14
Researchers' abilities to patent biotechnology products, coupled
with Congress' policy of promoting the placement of new products into
the marketplace, has greatly stimulated commercial interest in biotech-
nology. As a result, scientists can now transform diseased human tissue
into valuable therapeutic products. 5 Should the sources of this tissue be
entitled to compensation?
16
This issue burst upon the scene in Moore v. Regents of the University
of California.17 In Moore, the plaintiff, John Moore, entered the Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center with a rare form
of cancer that caused his spleen cells to develop unique characteristics.'"
Moore's spleen cells were unique in that they could produce a wide vari-
ety of valuable therapeutic products. 9 After surgically removing
7. One author estimates a market of $100 billion for biotechnology products by the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century. Tompkins, Capitalizing in Life, Sci. DIG., June 1986, at 35.
8. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TIssUE, supra note 4, at 49.
9. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
10. Id. at 309-10.
11. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 754-68 app. A,
249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 516-30 app. A (1988) (patent of "Mo" cell line derived from human
spleen), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479,271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990);
see also Biggart, Protecting Exclusivity in Biotechnology Developments, in BIOTECHNOLOGY
PATENT PRACTICE 7 (1986).
12. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211
(1988)). The law allows nonprofit institutions, including universities, to apply for patents on
federally funded inventions, and the federal agency which sponsored the project retains a
nonexclusive license. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TIssuE, supra note 4, at 50.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1988); see also OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 50.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 200. "It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising frem federally supported research or
development.... ." Id.
15. See infra notes 39-62 and accompanying text.
16. As Justice Mosk stated, "The issue is as new as its source-the recent explosive
growth in the commercialization of biotechnology." Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51
Cal. 3d 120, 161, 793 P.2d 479, 507, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 174 (1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
17. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
18. Id. at 125-27 & n.2, 793 P.2d at 481 & n.2, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148 & n.2.
19. Id. at 126-27, 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
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Moore's spleen, Dr. David Golde, Moore's physician, developed a cell
line from Moore's tissue without Moore's consent.20 Dr. Golde patented
the cell line, as well as the by-products derived therefrom, and entered
into development contracts with biotechnology companies for significant
profit.21 Moore claimed that he should have a right to share in the prof-
its from these products.22
In Moore, the California Supreme Court held that individuals do not
have a property right in their surgically removed body tissue. 23 The
court did hold, however, that patients have the right to informed consent
to the commercial use of their tissue.24 Under this theory, a doctor has a
fiduciary duty to disclose to his or her patients the prospect of potential
commercial gain from the use of their tissue.
2-
The court's holding in Moore creates many more questions than it
answers. First, how will courts apply traditional informed consent doc-
trine in these cases? Second, will this right to informed consent, perhaps
difficult to apply in practice, adequately protect the patient? Third, will
doctors and biotechnology companies be forced to contract with patients
for the right to use tissue commercially if patients consent only to their
tissue's surgical removal and not to its subsequent commercial use?
Fourth, will the legislature intervene to give patients more rights than
did the Moore court? Finally, if so, how should the legislature intervene?
This Comment analyzes why the court's holding in Moore does not
provide an adequate solution to the problems created by the commercial
use of human tissue. Specifically, this Comment demonstrates that: (1)
the court's expansion of the doctrine of informed consent does not ade-
quately protect patients' rights, nor promote research; (2) to protect
those rights, advance product development, and avoid an inequitable eco-
nomic return by doctors and biotechnology companies, a system involv-
ing compensation to tissue sources is necessary; (3) an uncontrolled
system under which tissue sources freely and independently contract for
the rights to their tissue would create legal uncertainties and public pol-
icy problems; and (4) legislative intervention to define, control and limit
patients' rights to compensation for use of their tissue is necessary to
balance the competing interests of the patient, the physician, the scien-
tific community and the public. Balancing these interests is difficult be-
20. Id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
21. Id at 127-28, 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
22. Id at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
23. Id. at 147, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
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cause these novel issues are complex and no single body of law, policy, or
ethics exists.
26
This Comment proposes a Uniform Tissue Source Compensation
Act to resolve the many problems involved in this area. Under the pro-
posed system, sources would be paid a fiat fee and would relinquish all
present and future economic rights in their tissue.
The legislation would adequately balance the interests of the indi-
vidual tissue source, biotechnology companies and the public. The
sources would be fairly compensated for the right to commercially use
their tissue. The biotechnology companies would be contracting with
sources for the right to their tissue at a fixed cost, without the threat of
future lawsuits. Finally, the public's interest would be advanced, because
such an act would encourage research and development of human tissue-
derived products, minimize research costs and prevent delays in the de-
velopment of therapeutic products.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGIES
Biotechnology involves the creation of new plant varieties, new
breeds of animals, new microorganisms,2" and by-products28 (human
therapeutic agents)2 9 through the application of engineering and techno-
logical principles.30 Most of the technological principles used to produce
valuable therapeutic products from human tissue and cells involve three
main techniques:3' tissue and cell culture technology,32 hybridoma tech-
nology33 and recombinant DNA technology.34 It is through the use of
tissue and cell culture techniques that scientists in Moore v. Regents of
the University of California3 transformed the plaintiff's tissue into valua-
ble therapeutic products.3 6 Advancements in these biotechnologies have
also created many social, medical, economic, legal and ethical issues.3 7
Thus, the nature of the techniques and how they can be used to manipu-
26. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 23.
27. Bent, Invention in Biotechnology: A Conceptual Approach, in BIOTECHNOLOGY PAT-
ENT PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 1.
28. Id.
29. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 31.
30. McGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS 162 (1974)
[hereinafter DICTIONARY].
31. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 31.
32. See infra notes 39-62 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 63-78 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
35. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
36. Id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
37. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 31.
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late human tissue into valuable commercial products must be understood
to appreciate the novel issues involved.3"
In the context of this Comment, knowledge of the basic techniques
is necessary for several reasons: (1) to recognize that the law should en-
courage the commercial use of human tissue; (2) to discern the value of
the tissue source's contribution to product development relative to the
highly skilled and technical work of scientists in the discovery and devel-
opment of marketable therapeutic products; (3) to recognize why limit-
ing compensation is not unfair to tissue sources; and (4) to comprehend
fully the novel legal problems that would be raised if tissue sources could
freely contract for the rights to their tissue.
The following sections discuss the three main biotechnology tech-
niques and the advantages of using human tissue and cell cultures to
develop products over employing the other two biotechnology
techniques.
A. Tissue and Cell Culture Technology
Tissue culture39 is not a new technique; it was first devised in 1907
for the purpose of studying physiological behavior of animal cells in vi-
tro."° Scientists theorized that by studying the behavior of tissue and
cells kept alive in vitro they could understand their functioning in vivo.
4 1
Tissue cultures can be established from a human tumor biopsy,
42
38. Id. Justice Mosk in his Moore dissent stated, "I dissociate myself completely from the
amateur biology lecture that the majority impose on us throughout their opinion .... because
[ as] they have no background in molecular biology[,] the majority may simply misunderstand
what they are reading. . . ." Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 182, 184, 793 P.2d at 521, 523, 271 Cal.
Rptr. at 188, 190 (1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk believes that in order to begin
solving the problems created by the commercial use of human tissue, an independent and
unbiased explanation of the scientific technology is essential. Id. at 184-85, 793 P.2d at 523,
271 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Mosk, J., dissenting). This background is designed to present an objec-
tive and thorough explanation of the biotechnology techniques involved.
39. Technically there is a distinction between a tissue culture, a cell culture and a cell line;
however, the term "tissue culture" is often used generically to include tissue culture, cell cul-
ture and cell line. R. FRESHNEY, CULTURE OF ANIMAL CELLS: A MANUAL OF BASIC TECH-
NIQUES 366 (2d ed. 1987). Tissue culture properly means the maintenance of a fragment of
tissue, whereas, a cell culture is a growth of cells dissociated from the parent tissue. Id. at 363,
366. A cell line is a propagated culture derived from a primary cell culture. Id. at 363. A
primary culture is defined as the culture established directly from cells, tissue or organs of the
biological source. Id. at 365.
40. R. FRESHNEY, supra note 39, at 1. In vitro pertains to biological reactions which take
place in artificial apparatuses; by contrast, in vivo pertains to biological reactions taking place
in living cells or organisms. DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 773.
41. Nardone, Cell Culture Methodology from Donor to Cell Lines, 5 BIoTECHNIQUES 122,
122 (1987). See supra note 40 for a definition of in vivo.
42. Nardone, supra note 41, at 124.
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solid human tissue or blood.43 When culturing tissue, scientists want to
create an established cell line.' An established cell line is a sample of
cells that are capable of continuous and indefinite growth.45 Most nor-
mal cells do not give rise to established cell lines,46 unless scientists em-
ploy some type of genetic engineering.'
The discovery that cultures from human tumors could give rise to
established cell lines sparked scientists' interest in human tissue.4" Cul-
tured tumor cells are valuable because they have the capability of pro-
ducing a wide variety of commercially useful therapeutic proteins.49
Thus, by creating a cell line that is capable of continuous growth, the
ability of scientists to produce marketable therapeutic products is greatly
enhanced.
In Moore, the scientists' goal was to develop an established cell line
derived from the plaintiff's leukemic spleen cells.50 This was because the
spleen cells were producing a number of therapeutically useful proteins.-"
In achieving their goal, the scientists created an incessant source of these
proteins.
Although human tumor cells have the potential to develop into an
established cell line, it is important to note that immortalization does not
result in all cases.52 The successful culturing of human tissue and cells is
considered an art. 3 The process of successfully developing a cell line
requires a great deal of highly skilled work involving many complex and
difficult techniques. 4 Although there have been many advancements in
43. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 33.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. R. FRESHNEY, supra note 39, at 9.
47. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 756 app. A, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 518 app. A (1988) ("Mo" cell line patent), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 51 Cal. 3d
120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990). See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text for
an explanation of genetic engineering.
48. R. FRESHNEY, supra note 39, at 1. The first established human cell line was called
HeLa (named after the patient-source Henrietta Lacks) and originated from a biopsy of a
cancerous cervical tumor. Hsu, Schacter, Delaney, Miller, McKusick, Kennett, Bodmer,
Young & Bodmer, Genetic Characteristics of the HeLa Cell, 191 SCIENCE 392, 392 (1976).
49. See Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 756 app. A, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 518 app. A ("Mo" cell
line patent).
50. See id. ("Mo" cell line patent).
51. See id. ("Mo" cell line patent).
52. R. FRESHNEY, supra note 39, at 289. Human mammary tumors can be cultured with
only about a ten percent success rate. Lasfargues, Human Mammary Tumors, in TISSUE CUL-
TURE: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 45, 49-50 (1973).
53. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 33.
54. See generally R. FRESHNEY, supra note 39; METHODS IN ENZYMOLOGY VOLUME
LVIII CELL CULTURE (W. Jakoby & I. Pastan eds. 1979); TISSUE CULTURE: METHODS AND
November 1990]
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biotechnology, the probability of establishing a cell line from human tis-
sue is low."5 Why one particular cell line will grow continuously and
another does not is unclear. 6 Consequently, cancerous tissue whose
cells are capable of developing into a cell line is rare and can be ex-
tremely valuable.
Tissue is classified as rare if an extremely small percentage of the
population has tissue with certain unique characteristics.5 7 Many people,
however, may have tissue with such characteristics but discovery of this
tissue is rare. 8 Truly rare tissue, by definition, is tissue that not only
exists within an extremely small percentage of the population, but also is
impossible to identify except by chance discovery. 9
A systematic method of identifying rare human tissue does not ex-
ist.' As a result, it is infrequent that a scientist does, in fact, discover
that a person has a rare type of tissue. Once a characteristic is identified
in one person's tissue, however, it usually can be detected in other tissue
with those same characteristics.6 Thus, the value of that tissue is not as
great as truly rare tissue. 2
APPLICATIONS (P. Kruse & M. Patterson eds. 1973). For example, when cultures are derived
from solid samples (tissue, tumors or organs), the samples must be minced and exposed to
enzymes for disaggregation. R. FRESHNEY, supra note 39, at 113-24. Only certain cells which
survive the process form the basis of the primary culture. Id. at 7. Special complex nutrients
must be provided in order to sustain the human cells. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra
note 4, at 32. In addition, scientists must strictly maintain the temperature of the culture
environment and keep the culture free from contaminants. Id. Because scientists are only
interested in certain special cells, such as cells which produce therapeutic proteins, selective
overgrowth of unspecialized cells is a major problem. R. FRESHNEY, supra note 39, at 137.
To overcome this problem, scientists must attempt to employ the often unsuccessful technique
of cloning to select specific cell types. Id. Cloning means that the entire population of cells is
derived from continual growth of a single cell. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4,
at 34. Finally, once the cell line is established and the specialized cells are producing the
proteins of interest, these proteins must be isolated by using various separation techniques.
Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 758 app. A, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 520 app. A ("Mo" cell line patent).
55. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 32.
56. R. FRESINEY, supra note 39, at 9. The ability of a cell line to grow may be due to its
capacity for genetic variation. Id.
57. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 55.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 56.
60. Id. at 55.
61. Id
62. It has been stated that "the issue of rarity in human biologicals used in biotechnologi-
cal research takes the form of a pyramid." Id. at 56. The vast majority of biological materials
are readily obtainable, representing the bottom two-thirds of the pyramid; higher on the pyra-
mid is an intermediate level, where particular tissues may have some uncommon characteris-
tics or occur in low frequency; and at the top of the pyramid are the truly rare biological
materials which occur in only a few cases. Id.
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B. Hybridoma Technology
It is rare to develop a cell line directly from human tissue; therefore,
as an alternative, scientists may employ hybridoma technology to pro-
duce therapeutic proteins. Hybridomas are new cells created from the
fusion of two different cell types.6 3 Hybridomas are made by fusing tu-
mor cells, called myeloma cells, with either T lymphocytes (T-cells) 4 or
B lymphocytes (B-cells).65 Myeloma cells have the ability to grow con-
tinuously in culture.66 T lymphocytes produce a variety of proteins,
called lymphokines,67 whereas B lymphocytes produce antibodies.68
Both of these cells produce therapeutically useful substances,69 but they
are incapable of sustained growth and cultivation.7" Hence, by fusing
tumor cells with either of these cells, scientists create an immortal cell
line that will become a continuous source of proteins or antibodies.7 1
The culture conditions and techniques employed for hybridomas are
essentially the same as those previously described for tissue and cell cul-
63. Id. at 157. The method was first described by Kohler and Milstein in 1975. Casali,
Inghirami, Nakamura, Davies & Notkins, Human Monoclonalsfrom Antigen-Specific Selection
of B Lymphocytes and Transformation of EBV, 234 SCIENCE 476, 476 (1986) [hereinafter
Casali].
64. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 40. T lymphocytes are also called T-
cells. Id.
65. Id. at 38. B lymphocytes are also called B-cells. Id. at 37.
66. Id. at 38.
67. Id. at 39. Lymphokines are essential in regulating the immune response and act in
concert with antibodies in order to effectuate an immune response. Id. The immune response
protects the body against disease. Id. at 37; see also infra note 68.
68. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 37. The B lymphocytes in the
human body produce antibodies in an immune response to invasions of foreign substances,
called antigens, in order to protect the body against disease. Id. Each B lymphocyte is capable
of producing antibodies which can counteract only one specific antigen. Id. To obtain B lym-
phocytes, scientists inject a chosen antigen (e.g., a virus) of interest into an animal source and
isolate the B lymphocytes which produce the specific antibody. Id. at 38.
69. Id. at 37-40. B lymphocytes produce a variety of antibodies. Id. at 37-38. T lympho-
cytes produce an assortment of lymphokines with therapeutic potential, including interferon,
interleukin-1 (IL-1 or lymphocyte activation factor), interleukin-2 (IL-2 or T-cell growth fac-
tor), interleukin-3 (IL-3), interleukin-4 (IL-4), colony stimulating factors (CSF), B-cell growth
factor, macrophage activity factor, T-cell replacing factor, and migration inhibition factor. Id.
at 40. Also, some lymphokines stimulate B lymphocytes to produce antibodies. Id. at 39.
70. Id. at 38.
71. Id. at 38-40. See supra note 69 for an example of therapeutic proteins produced by
T lymphocytes. Each particular B-cell hybridoma cell line is capable of producing only a
single specific type of antibody called a monoclonal antibody. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN Tis-
SUE, supra note 4, at 38. Although B lymphocytes, by themselves, produce a variety of useful
antibodies that can be isolated from blood, it was not until scientists were able to create
monoclonal antibodies through the use of cell lines that the antibodies could be therapeutically
useful. Id. at 37-38.
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ture.72 However, virtually all monoclonal antibodies73 currently used
therapeutically in humans are derived from mice.74 When using
monoclonal antibodies derived from mice in humans there is always the
danger that an allergic response will result.7" Attempts to extend the
technology to the production of human monoclonal antibodies have not
been very successful.76 In addition, although isolated lymphokines have
potential therapeutic value,77 the T-cell hybridoma cell lines produced so
far have not been capable of generating sufficient quantities of
lymphokines for widespread therapeutic use.78
C. Recombinant DNA Technology
Genes are the basic units of heredity. 79 Chromosomes, which carry
genes,8° are composed of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).81 DNA, which
is present in every cell of living organisms, directs the functions of that
cell.82
72. Id. at 38; see supra note 54 and accompanying text. For example, scientists must
isolate and separate the proteins or monoclonal antibodies from the hybridoma cell line.
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TIssuE, supra note 4, at 38-40.
73. Monoclonal antibodies are identical antibodies that recognize a single specific antigen.
Id. at 157; see also supra note 71.
74. Pinsky, Monoclonal Antibodies: Progress is Slow But Sure, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED.
704, 704 (1986).
75. Id.
76. Casali, supra note 63, at 476. However, a promising new method has been developed
which produces large quantities of human monoclonal antibodies. Id.
77. See supra note 69 for a list of lymphokines with therapeutic value.
78. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 40. However, human T-cell
hybridoma cell lines are still valuable because they provide a source of lymphokine genes
which may be used in other genetic engineering techniques for continuous large scale produc-
tion of the proteins. Id.
79. DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 613. In 1865, Gregor Mendel identified this basic
mechanism of heredity. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 41.
80. DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 266.
81. Ord & Stocken, The Nucleus, in CELL BIOLOGY IN MEDICINE, 151, 155 (E. Bittar ed.
1973).
82. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 34. In the late nineteenth century,
DNA was discovered to be within the nucleus of the cell. Ord & Stocken, supra note 81, at
155. The nucleus of a cell is a small mass of proteins surrounded by a membrane, found in
most animal and plant cells, and functions in metabolism, growth and reproduction. DICTION-
ARY, supra note 30, at 1021. In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick proposed that the
structure of DNA was a double-stranded helix. T. SOLOMON, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 991-93
(1976). Watson and Crick's proposal was verified by Wilkens using X-ray analysis. Id. at 991.
The DNA double helix structure is formed by a series of four predictably pairing chemical
subunits called bases. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 41. The four bases are
guanine, adenine, thymine and cytosine. Id. Normally, guanine always pairs with adenine
and cytosine with thymine. Id. The unique ordering of these bases in the helix encodes for the
particular function of the gene. Id.
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Recombinant DNA technology involves the use of complex tech-
niques to manipulate genetic material to develop biological compounds.8 3
Two general types of genes exist: structural genes which encode for
products, such as proteins, and regulatory genes which command the
production and quantity of substances.8 4 The specific product which re-
sults and its amount can, therefore, be manipulated by altering the DNA
of genes.
Scientists discovered that naturally occurring enzymes produced by
bacteria, called restriction enzymes, recognized and cut DNA at specific
points.85 Once cut, the exposed ends attach to other strands of DNA.86
The resulting strand of DNA is called "recombinant DNA. '87 This dis-
covery allowed scientists to clone genes.88 Gene cloning is the process of
joining segments of DNA in a particular sequence to manufacture multi-
ple copies of a particular piece of DNA. 9
A major goal of recombinant DNA techniques is to implant recom-
binant DNA for a specific purpose into an organism, usually a bacte-
rium, under conditions which will cause the cloned gene to be replicated
more abundantly than the native gene.90 The genetically engineered or-
ganism will produce potentially valuable therapeutic proteins.91 For ex-
ample, if the gene responsible for production of human insulin is
engineered by producing the recombinant DNA molecule, it can be in-
troduced into a host organism and will copy itself many times; as a re-
sult, the host will produce large amounts of human insulin.92 The
process requires employment of a group of recombinant DNA technolog-
ical methods.93
83. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 41. The term "genetic engineering"
is synonymous with the term "recombinant DNA." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 42-43.
86. Id. at 43.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 42.
89. Id.
90. Abelson, Biotechnology: An Overview, 219 SCIENCE 611, 611 (1983).
91. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, 44-45. Three commercial products
created by recombinant DNA technology have been approved by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) for therapeutic use in humans (human growth hormone, human insulin, and
human alpha interferon). Id. at 45.
92. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE 33 (1982).
93. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 42. Recombinant DNA technology
generally works as follows: Donor DNA is cut by restriction enzymes into several fragments.
Id. at 43. Once cut, the exposed ends attach to other DNA fragments known as vector DNA
and result in recombinant DNA. Id. Vectors can be derived from many sources, bacterial,
viral, etc. Id. Different vectors are capable of performing various functions. Id. For example,
November 1990]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:115
D. The Advantages of Using Human Tissue Cultures
Using human tissue culture techniques to produce therapeutic prod-
ucts can be more cost-effective and more feasible than employing other
biotechnologies. This is because while human cell lines produce a wide
variety of proteins,9 4 hybridomas or recombinant DNA hosts typically
produce single products.9" In addition, not only can scientists produce
multiple products using human cell lines, but, because the cell directly
produces the proteins of interest, they also can save costs by avoiding the
numerous steps required for genetic engineering.96 For example, the pu-
rification of a protein is greatly simplified when the protein is secreted
from a cell directly into a medium." This is how the cell line used in
Moore produces its proteins.98 When using recombinant DNA tech-
niques, however, the proteins typically must be purified away from all
other cellular components. 99 Also, any recombinant DNA technique re-
quires the discovery of the appropriate gene probe, 100 and since this is the
most difficult part of the genetic engineering process, 10 1 significant cost
savings result from using a human cell line.
some vectors are capable of maintaining the stability of a large piece of foreign DNA, whereas
others reproduce rapidly and in high copy number. Id. In commercialization of recombinant
DNA products, it is critical that the vector have the ability to achieve high product expression.
Id. The recombinant DNA is then introduced into a host, which is an organism, often the
bacterium Escherichia coil. Id. Human cells, yeasts and other cells may also be used as hosts.
Id. The host provides an optimum environment for increasing the number of copies of the
cloned DNA, thereby producing large amounts of a gene, its product, or both. Id. Only some
host cells will accept the recombinant DNA. Id. The host cells that accepted the recombinant
DNA are identified by adding antibiotics that kill those host cells that did not take up the
recombinant DNA. Id. Finally, the small number of hosts containing the recombinant DNA
of interest are detected by a gene probe. Id. A gene probe is one of a variety of different
proteins which specifically binds to the desired gene. Id. at 43-44. The most difficult part of
the process is discovering a suitable probe. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at
37.
94. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 756 app. A, 249
Cal. Rptr. 494, 518 app. A (1988) ("Mo" cell line patent), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 51
Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
95. See OWNERSHIP OF HumAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 38; see also Moore, 215 Cal.
App. 3d at 756 app. A, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 518 app. A ("Mo" cell line patent).
96. Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 756 app. A, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 518 app. A ("Mo" cell line
patent).
97. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 38.
98. See Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 767 app. A, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 529 app. A ("Mo" cell
line patent).
99. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 38. It is possible to perform addi-
tional recombinant DNA techniques that will direct the cell to secrete the protein. Id. How-
ever, even if it is possible, the additional steps would increase the cost.
100. See supra note 93.
101. See supra note 93.
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Human tissue culture technology also has advantages over
hybridoma technology. A human cell line can produce therapeutically
valuable lymphokines, such as IL-2, interferon, and colony-stimulating
factor (CSF), 102 in isolatable amounts.10 3 This may be of great value
since sufficient quantities of lymphokines can be produced for widespread
therapeutic use, whereas hybridoma cell lines cannot produce such quan-
tities."° Another advantage of using human cell lines over hybridomas
is that products are derived directly from human tissue as opposed to
rodent cells.105 This significantly reduces the possibility of an allergic
reaction occurring when the products are used to treat humans.10 6 The
likelihood of allergic reactions in humans could be of great concern to a
company considering potential product liability risks and, as a result,
may deter potentially valuable research.
Truly unique human tissue may be extremely valuable."0 7 If a bio-
technology company does not reach an agreement with a particular tis-
sue source, it may never again have the opportunity to obtain such tissue.
In light of the speculative commercial value of products derivable from
the tissue, a biotechnology company confronted with this situation may
be forced to consider several factors, including: (1) whether other tech-
niques may be developed which allow for detection of this rare character-
istic in other sources, 0 8 and (2) whether other biotechniques, such as
recombinant DNA, can be used to reproduce the uniqueness without
need of the tissue itself.10 9
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Scientists have developed technology whereby human tissue may
provide one of the most promising sources of valuable therapeutic prod-
102. See, ag., Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 762 app. A, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 524 app. A ("Mo"
cell line patent).
103. See id. at 756 app. A, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 518 app. A ("Mo" cell line patent); see also
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 35.
104. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Lymphokines are typically present in
human blood in only parts per billion. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 39.
For example, interferon, which is one of the most abundant lymphokines, is in such low levels
in blood that it takes about 65,000 liters of blood to produce 100 milligrams of interferon. Id.
at 39-40. "A comparable task would be the search for less than one-eighth of a teaspoon of salt
in a swimming pool." Id. at 40.
105. Compare supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text with supra notes 73-76 and accom-
panying text.
106. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rarity of human
tissue with potential therapeutic value.
108. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 56.
109. See id.
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ucts. The problem in formulating an appropriate legal right in bodily
tissue is balancing the many interests involved.
There is a significant public interest in encouraging research and de-
velopment of products that can potentially treat many human diseases,
including AIDS.110 The federal government has an interest in advancing
patent law policy designed to encourage research.11 Biotechnology
companies have an interest in gaining access to unique tissue in order to
develop therapeutic products for commercialization and profit." 2 On
the other hand, individual tissue sources maintain strong economic and
privacy interests which must be balanced against the extraordinary pub-
lic interests and the interests of the biotechnology industry.
In attempting to balance these competing interests in Moore v. Re-
gents of the University of California,I" the California Supreme Court has
created much uncertainty. In Moore, the court held that patients do not
have a property right in their bodily tissue." 4 One of the court's goals in
denying such a right was to advance research and product development
by ensuring that biotechnology companies would not be held liable under
conversion for using human tissue.115 The court, however, did offer
some protection for unconsenting patients. Based on previously devel-
oped concepts, the court held that a patient's right to informed
consent" 6 includes disclosure of information regarding potential com-
mercialization of his or her bodily tissue." 7 The Moore court believed
that such a right would adequately protect a person's rights of privacy
and autonomy. 
11 8
In practice, however, it may be difficult to apply traditional in-
110. See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text. In addition, these companies have an
interest in being able to use human tissue for commercial development absent fear of future
liability. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
113. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
114. Id. at 147, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
115. Id. at 143, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160. Conversion is the unlawful exercise
of dominion and control over another's personal property, to the exclusion of or inconsistent
with the rights of the owner. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (5th ed. 1979); see also W.P.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 15 (1984).
116. Under traditional informed consent doctrine, a physician has a duty to disclose to
patients all facts necessary to make an informed decision on whether to undergo the proposed
treatment. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972).
See also infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to informed
consent.
117. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
118. Id. at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
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formed consent doctrine to the Moore-type situation because the main
purpose of the doctrine is to allow patients to decide whether to consent
to treatment 19 and not whether to consent to the subsequent use of their
tissue.120 Consequently, the Moore court's holding may not adequately
protect patients' rights. On the other hand, if patients may consent only
to their tissue's surgical removal and not to its subsequent commercial
use, product development may be hindered because scientists may lose a
unique opportunity to acquire therapeutically valuable tissue.
The Moore decision also left unclear whether, under freedom of con-
tract principles, 121 a doctor or biotechnology company can compensate
otherwise unconsenting patients for the right to commercial use of their
tissue. Due, however, to the complex technology required to develop
human tissue-derived products, as well as the unique subject matter and
circumstances upon which parties would be contracting, enforceability of
tissue contracts remains uncertain.122
Another problem is that some form of compensation may be neces-
sary to provide an incentive for patients to consent, and thereby increase
the amount of available tissue. However, if sources may freely negotiate
for the highest price for the commercial rights to their tissue, such nego-
tiation will cause delay in product development and increase the cost of
the therapeutic products.12 3 Such consequences are against the public
interest.
This Comment contends that existing statutory and common-law
concepts are inappropriate to apply to the unique problems involved in
using human tissue to produce commercial therapeutic products. There
is no discrete body of law that deals specifically with such use of human
tissue, and biotechnology has advanced beyond existing law.' 24 Relying
on common law to solve these problems is misguided because common
119. See Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
120. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems apply-
ing traditional informed consent doctrine in the context of Moore.
121. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.7 (2d ed. 1990); OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TIs-
SUE, supra note 4, at 9.
122. See infra notes 300-61 and accompanying text. A great part of the problem lies in the
fact that it is difficult to determine a fair value for raw tissue. If a contract is executed and the
products subsequently developed from the tissue become much more valuable than antici-
pated, the source may be able to rescind the contract. The source may then be able to sue in
quasi-contract. Under quasi-contractual liability a scientist or biotechnology company receiv-
ing a benefit which would be unjust to retain must pay the reasonable value of the benefit to the
tissue source. The threat of quasi-contractual liability may discourage research and develop-
ment of human tissue-derived products, since companies could not adequately estimate their
costs and would be uncertain as to whether they might be subject to future litigation.
123. See infra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
124. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 9.
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law merely reacts to injuries only after they have occurred and does not
anticipate developing interests.125 Because the Moore ruling is control-
ling only in California, other state courts faced with these problems may
make their own decisions. As the court expressed in Moore, however,
such complex policy decisions are more appropriately the subject of legis-
lative deliberation and resolution.1 26 Accordingly, in order to advance
product development and avoid inequities, Congress or a state legislature
should develop a system whereby sources are compensated for the rights
to use their tissue. However, such a system should not allow for a free
market in human tissue. Instead, a Uniform Tissue Source Compensa-
tion Act should be enacted that limits a source's compensation.
IV. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S FAILED ATTEMPT TO
DEFINE A RIGHT IN A PERSON'S BODILY TISSUE
A. The Facts of Moore 27
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California,128 Dr. Golde
diagnosed the plaintiff, John Moore, as having hairy-cell leukemia.
12 9
Moore's form of cancer was rare. 130 Moore's spleen was removed at
UCLA Medical Center as part of his cancer treatment.
1 3
Before the surgery, Moore signed a standard surgical consent form
to remove his spleen, as well as some other tissue and blood. 132 For al-
most seven years subsequent to the surgery, Dr. Golde continued to take
blood and semen samples from Moore. 133
Moore brought an action for conversion against Dr. Golde, a UCLA
research technician, the Regents of the University of California (Re-
gents), Sandoz Pharmaceuticals (Sandoz) and Genetics Institute Inc.
(Genetics) claiming misappropriation of his tissue and cells. 134 However,
125. Id.
126. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 136, 793 P.2d at 488, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
127. The facts are based on unproven allegations of the complaint. Moore v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 125, 793 P.2d 479, 480, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 147 (1990).
128. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
129. Id. at 125, 793 P.2d at 480, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
130. Only an estimated 250 Americans per year contract hairy-cell leukemia. Bi-
opharmaceuticals: New Technology Unlocks the Body's Medicine Cabinet, MED. WORLD
NEWS, Mar. 25, 1985, at 45.
131. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 125, 793 P.2d at 480-81, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48. Moore eventually filed a third
amended complaint alleging causes of action for: (1) conversion; (2) lack of informed consent;
(3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) fraud and deceit; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) quasi-contract; (7)
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (8) intentional infliction of emotional
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Moore's complaint alleged that prior to the surgery, Golde and the other
defendants knew of the value of Moore's unique tissue and bodily sub-
stances, and without his consent formed the intent to establish cell lines
and by-products therefrom.13 1 Moore was never informed by the defend-
ants of the commercial value of potential products derivable from his cell
line.1 36 This value was estimated to be three billion dollars.
1 37
After the surgery, defendants took a portion of Moore's spleen to
establish a cell line1 31 which produced a variety of valuable therapeutic
proteins. 139 The defendants obtained a patent on the plaintiff's cell line
(designated "Mo" cell line) and nine products derived from the cell
line."4° Golde entered into contracts with Sandoz and Genetics to com-
mercialize the "Mo" cell line.141 Genetics transferred to Golde 75,000
shares of its stock at a nominal price and, in addition, paid the Regents
and Golde $330,000 over three years. 42 Sandoz paid the Regents and
Golde $110,000.43
Moore claimed that the use of his splenic tissue led to the "Mo" cell
line and its products.'" Moore further alleged that he should share in
profits gained from the commercial use of his cells and any products de-
rived from his biological material. 4 '
distress; (9) negligent misrepresentation; (10) interference with prospective advantageous eco-
nomic relationships; (11) slander of title; (12) accounting; and (13) declaratory relief. Id. at
128 n.4, 793 P.2d at 482 n.4, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149 n.4.
135. Id. at 125-26, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
136. Id. at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
137. Id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
138. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of cell lines.
139. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127 & n.2, 793 P.2d at 481-82 & n.2, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49 &
n.2.
140. See id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49. Products from the "Mo"
cell line included (1) Colony-Stimulating Factor (CSF); (2) Erythroid-Potentiating Activity
(EPA); (3) Immune Interferon (Type I); (4) Neutrophil Migration-Inhibitory Factor (NIF-
T); (5) T-cell Growth Factor (TCFG, Interleukin II); (6) Macrophage-Activating Factor
(MAF); (7) Factor-Stimulating Fibroblast Growth; (8) Factor-Stimulating Human Pluripotent
Hematopoietic Stem Cell; (9) Factor-Stimulating Human Leukemic Cells in vitro. Moore v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709,719 n.6, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501 n.6 (1988).
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990);'id. at
762 app. A, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 524 app. A ("Mo" cell line patent).
141. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127-28, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
142. Id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 126-27, 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
145. Id. at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
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B. The Moore Court's Holding
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California,146 the California
Supreme Court could have concluded that patients have a property right
in their tissue and that, based on that right, Moore had stated a cause of
action in conversion. Instead, the court held that patients do not have a
property right in their surgically removed tissue. 147 The court, however,
also held that individuals do have a right to informed consent before a
doctor may commercially use their tissue. 148 The court determined that
in soliciting a patient's consent to surgery, a physician has a fiduciary
duty"4 to disclose any potential economic gain that the doctor may real-
ize from the post-operative use of the patient's tissue.1 50
The doctrine of informed consent is based on principles of individual
autonomy and the special relationship between the doctor and patient.151
Informed consent doctrine developed out of the concept that all human
beings have the right to determine what shall be done with their
bodies.'
52
According to traditional disclosure rules, the doctor has a duty to
disclose all information which is "material." '53 Material information is
that which a reasonable person in the patient's position would find signif-
icant. 54 Thus, the Moore court concluded that "material" information
includes any potential commercial gain that a doctor may realize from
the use of a patient's tissue.1
55
146. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
147. Id. at 147, 793 P.2d at 496-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64. Accordingly, the court held
that the plaintiff could not state a cause of action in conversion. Id.
148. Id. at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
149. A fiduciary duty arises when there is a relationship of trust and confidence, and the
placing of reliance by one person upon the judgment of another. Vai v. Bank of America, 56
Cal. 2d 329, 337-38, 364 P.2d 247, 252, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1961); BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARy 564 (5th ed. 1979). A person having a fiduciary duty must act in scrupulous good faith
primarily for another's benefit. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, app. C at 157,
150. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
151. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A RE-
PORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PA-
TIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 16-17, 51 (1982).
152. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914),
overruled on other grounds in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3
(1947).
153. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972).
154. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 291, 611 P.2d 902, 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 311
(1980).
155. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152. The Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) stated that such disclosure requirements should include: the
nature and purpose of using the human tissue; the probable benefits flowing from obtaining the
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Under a typical application of the doctrine, the physician has a duty
to disclose to the patient all facts necessary to allow the patient to formu-
late an informed decision on whether to undergo the proposed treatment
or surgery. 15 6 Generally, such disclosure should include the nature of
the diagnosed condition, the risks associated with the proposed treatment
or surgery, the availability of alternatives and associated risks, an expla-
nation of probable complications and discomforts, and the risks associ-
ated with not undergoing any treatment.1 57  The informed consent
doctrine in the medical treatment context, therefore, mainly focuses on
the risks of treatment and not the disposition of human tissue. Unfortu-
nately, the majority in Moore did not identify how its newly-created doc-
trine will apply.
V. ANALYSIS OF COMPETING INTERESTS
One major concern involved in developing a legal right in a person's
bodily tissue is that the right must adequately balance the interests of the
individual, the biotechnology industry, the federal government and the
public. An analysis of these interests and policy concerns reveals that the
right to informed consent as developed by the Moore court will not sig-
nificantly advance all of these interests.
A. The Interests of the Individual Tissue Source
A person should have the right to decide what will be done with his
or her own body." 8 Patients, not their doctors, should possess the right
to determine the use to which their body parts will be put after re-
moval.' 9 The majority in Moore believed that one policy of overriding
importance is the protection of a person's right to make autonomous
tissue and probable beneficiaries; the possible commercial gain that may result from developing
the tissue; the right to withdraw consent to the tissue's use. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE,
supra note 4, at 105-06.
156. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
157. F. RoZOvsKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 41-52 (1984). Laws
also exist that require disclosure of far more information for consent of human research sub-
jects to be valid. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24179 (West Supp. 1986); 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.116 (1990).
158. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914),
overruled on other grounds in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3
(1947).
159. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 151, 793 P.2d 479, 499, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 166 (1990) (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Broussard argued
that the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act makes it quite clear that patients have the right to
decide, before their tissue is removed, the permissible uses to which their tissue may be put
after removal. Id. at 154, 793 P.2d at 501,271 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting); see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7156.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1990).
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medical decisions."6 The court agreed that "'[a] patient must have the
ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her tissues. To hold
otherwise would open the door to a massive invasion of human privacy
and dignity in the name of medical progress.' "161
The right to privacy also recognizes that individuals have a right to
determine whether to give to the public something which is theirs.
162
Accordingly, this privacy interest is violated if individuals are denied the
opportunity to decide whether to grant consent to their tissue becoming
part of the public domain. This interest includes the right to be compen-
sated if human tissue is used commercially.
1 63
In support of this financial interest, Justice Broussard argued that
the majority failed to mention the tissue source's interest in obtaining the
economic value of his or her own body parts.)64 "Although such eco-
nomic value may constitute a fortuitous 'windfall' to the patient, the for-
tuitous nature of the economic value does not justify the creation of a
novel exception.., which sanctions... misappropriation of that value
from the patient."
1 6
B. The Interests of the Biotechnology Industry
The potential profits that can be obtained from human tissue-de-
rived therapeutic products are enormous.166 Consequently, the biotech-
nology industry has a financial interest in gaining access to unique
human tissue in order to develop these commercially valuable products.
It has been stated that "[t]he path leading from the concept for a
drug to a marketable product is arduous, costly, and extremely specula-
tive."' 67 The process leading to commercialization of a human tissue de-
rived product can require efforts for a period of eighty years. 168 The cost
160. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 129, 143, 793 P.2d at 483, 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150, 160.
161. Id. at 139-40, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158 (quoting Moore v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 730, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508 (1988)). However, the
Moore majority did not believe that a cause of action in conversion was necessary to protect
privacy and dignity since that could be accomplished by the right to informed consent. Id. at
140, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
162. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 199 (1890).
163. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 115.
164. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 159, 793 P.2d at 505, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (Broussard, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
165. Id (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
166. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 127, 793 P.2d 479, 482, 271
Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (1990); see also supra note 7.
167. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 150.
168. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 60-61 (case history of development
of a human tumor derived product, angiogenin). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
requires a human therapeutic product to undergo research, development and regulatory
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of putting a single product through this process has been estimated to be
sixty-five to one hundred million dollars. 69 Furthermore, whether a
source's tissue or cells ever result in a marketable product is highly spec-
ulative-only about twelve percent of the products which enter human
clinical trials ever reach the market.170
Another significant interest of the biotechnology industry is the
elimination of uncertainty.1 7' An important policy consideration for the
Moore court was that it "not threaten with disabling civil liability inno-
cent parties who are engaged in socially useful activities, such as re-
searchers ... .,,172 All of the effort, time, money and risk involved in
commercializing a human tissue-derived therapeutic product is borne by
the biotechnology company. Adding a threat of liability would likely
discourage biotechnology companies, especially small companies, from
investing in the development of "socially useful" human tissue-derived
therapeutic products.'73 Uncertainty about how courts would resolve
disputes between biotechnology companies and sources could be detri-
mental to the biotechnology industry.'7 4 Consequently, resolving the
current uncertainty is important to the future of the biotechnology
industry. 
7
processes before it can be marketed. Generally the product development process includes the
following steps:
1. Research: Scientists must identify, purify and characterize the natural protein. The
product may be produced by use of one of the biotechnology techniques.
2. Research and Development: The product must be improved and laboratory tested.
3. Development: The product is formulated into a therapeutic form. The formulation
must be-prepared and the process scaled-up for manufacture.
4. Preclinical Testing: The product must be tested for toxicity and efficacy in animals.
5. Clinical Testing-Physician IND (Investigational New Drug): A physician, rather
than the corporation, sponsors human patient testing of the product at one or more clinics.
6. Clinical Trials Phases I-III: The product goes through a series of phases to determine
safety, dosage and efficacy in human patients.
7. Product License Approval Filing: The company files information for FDA approval of
sale to patients. Id. at 61.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 60.
171. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61; Schlicher,
Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Licensing Biotechnology Patent and Related
Property Rights in the United States, 29 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 263, 284 (1987).
172. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
173. See id., 793 P.2d at 493-94, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
174. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 27.
175. Id. ("resolving the current uncertainty may be more important to the future of bio-
technology than resolving it in any particular way"); see also Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143, 793
P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
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C. The Public Interest
The public has a significant interest in gaining access to life-saving
therapeutic products. 176 In Moore, the majority declined to grant indi-
viduals a property right in their surgically removed body tissue because
"[t]o impose such a duty.., would affect medical research of importance
to all of society ....,1 7  Thus, an overriding concern was to encourage
research and product development.1 78  To effectuate this policy, the
Moore court declined to expand conversion liability to protect individ-
ual's rights because to do so would "threaten [researchers] with disabling
civil liability" for using human tissue. 1 7 9 Such potential liability, the ma-
jority reasoned, would create uncertainty that could adversely affect
product development. 80
This interest is consistent with Congress' interest in enacting patent
laws to foster research and development, as well as economic growth.181
The public would suffer if patent goals are not advanced because thera-
peutic products would not become available. 1 2
The public also has an interest in new treatments becoming available
as quickly as possible. If researchers do not have available tissue to de-
velop products, then they must instead attempt to develop alternative
technologies. 3 Since the technology now exists for using human tissue
to produce therapeutic products, this delay could cost many lives.
Finally, therapeutic products should not only become readily avail-
able, but their costs should not be so high as to become prohibitive.
1 84
Consequently, the public has an interest in keeping the price of these
products affordable. If not, only the wealthy would benefit from product
development.
D. The Interests of the Federal Government
The interests of the federal government are evidenced by patent
176. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 115.
177. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 135, 793 P.2d 479, 487, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 154 (1990).
178. Id. at 143, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
179. Id., 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
180. Id, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
181. See infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
182. In addition, investments to commercialize biotechnology products exceeded one billion
dollars in 1983 alone. See supra note 6. Therefore, any decrease in research activities may
reduce investment activity in biotechnology which, in turn, may have a detrimental effect on
the economy.
183. See supra notes 63-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of these alternative
technologies.
184. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TIssuE, supra note 4, at 115.
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laws. To ascertain what actions the law should encourage, an awareness
of the policy concerns of intellectual property is essential. These policies
also encompass the public interest in encouraging research and develop-
ment, as well as the biotechnology industry's interest in protecting its
inventions. An analysis of patent laws and policies reveals that the right
to informed consent as developed in Moore will not adequately advance
these interests.
Knowledge of patent law is necessary for another reason. Before the
advent of the commercial potential of biotechnology, researchers were
not motivated to seek patent protection. 85 This is because it was re-
garded as being against scientific norms to claim exclusive rights in re-
search discoveries.186 Consequently, commercial potential of recent
advances in biotechnology has created a conflict between traditional poli-
cies of patent law and scientific research. 8 ' This commercial potential
has also created the issues raised in the Moore case. The fact is that
scientists are entrepreneurs 188 -"scientists for profit." Hence, their
motivations are not purely altruistic. In addition, congressional interest
in reforming patent laws is to foster economic well-being.' 89 If both the
scientists' and the government's motivations are financial, why should
185. See R. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
267, 275 (N. Storer ed. 1973) [hereinafter Normative Structure].
186. Id. at 275-77. Traditionally, the foremost goal of science has been to extend certified
knowledge through empirical research. Id. at 267. The scientist's motivation in advancing
certified knowledge was to benefit humanity. M. KENNY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVER-
SITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 32 (1986). Scientific discoveries were thought to be a product of
the scientific community as a whole because all new discoveries were the result of previous
ones and future discoveries would be built upon them. Normative Structure, supra note 185, at
273-75.
Scientists should be motivated by a desire to seek knowledge and not to further their own
financial interests. Id. at 275-77. Professional recognition should be the motivation for re-
searchers to add to the wealth of scientific knowledge. R. MERTON, Priorities in Scientific
Discovery, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE, supra note 185, at 286, 293-96. As a result, such
recognition should provide scientists with an incentive to publish their discoveries. R.
MERTON, Behavior Patterns of Scientists, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE, supra note 185, at
325, 325.
Once published, the findings become part of the public domain and cannot be patented.
35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1988); see also I. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW § 1.03, at
1-19 (1985). Because publication interferes with the acquisition of patent rights, intellectual
property law has been thought to conflict with traditional scientific research policy. Eisenberg,
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 184
(1987).
187. See also Eisenberg, supra note 186, at 178-79. Today, some scientists fear that com-
mercial incentives may interfere with and undermine traditional norms of scientific research.
See id. at 177.
188. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 186 (scientists have become more interested in
protecting the commercial value of their research than in benefiting society).
189. Bent, supra note 27, at 27. One reason for this interest is that because a patent protects
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the law expect the tissue sources' motivation to be solely altruistic? The
fact is that tissue sources may demand payment before consenting to the
commercial use of their tissue. Compensation to tissue sources, there-
fore, may be necessary to advance the interests of the federal government
and others. Because compensation to tissue sources may be necessary,
fair value of the tissue becomes an issue. Therefore, in order to analyze
the value of a source's contribution, knowledge of patent laws is also
important to understand what is patentable and what degree of work190
is required by scientists before they can patent human tissue and cell
products.
1. Patent law policy
According to the United States Constitution, patent laws were en-
acted for the purpose of promoting the "[p]rogress of... useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their
... Discoveries."191 A patent grants the exclusive right to make, use and
sell the invention 92 for a period of seventeen years. 193
The four traditional objectives upon which modern patent legisla-
tion is based were formulated by Fritz Machlup in his well known histor-
ical and economic analysis of the patent system. 194
According to these widely accepted "patent theories" patents
are granted:
To recognize the intellectual property of the inventor; To re-
ward the inventor for his useful services as "teacher of the na-
tion"; To encourage inventors and industry to invent, invest
and innovate; and finally; To further the early disclosure and
wide dissemination of technical knowledge.1 95
The policy rationale behind granting exclusivity is that of encouraging
disclosure of the invention to the public, thereby "adding to the sum of
an invention, it provides inventors and investors with an incentive to risk time and money.
COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 385.
190. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for an illustration of the amount of tech-
nical work required to produce a patentable product using tissue culture technology.
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The term "useful Arts" has been interpreted to include
applied technology. See, eg., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958-59 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub
nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303 (1980).
192. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
193. Id. § 154.
194. Beier & Straus, Patents in a Time of Rapid Scientific and Technological Change: In-
ventions in Biotechnology, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT PROTECTION: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW 15, 17 (1985).
195. Id.
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human knowledge."' 196 The desired result is an increase in technical in-
novation and industrial development.
197
If biotechnology companies could not prevent competitors from us-
ing or capitalizing on the results of their research and development ef-
forts, many new and speculative projects would not be undertaken. 198
Addressing this concern, the United States patent law system was
designed to provide the best form of protection for biotechnological in-
ventions. 99 The policy emphasis, however, has shifted to economic
growth,2"° and recognizing and rewarding intellectual efforts is no longer
an important objective of current legislation.2 0 ' Consequently, since the
federal government has an economic interest in research and develop-
ment, arguably tissue sources, whose tissue helps advance that interest,
should have an interest in being compensated.
2. Patent law requirements
High technology industries have traditionally relied on utility pat-
ents in order to obtain exclusivity and competitive advantage.2"2 An in-
vention must be within patentable subject matter,2 "3 and must be new,2 ° '
useful 20 5 and unobvious. 20 6 Additionally, in order to qualify for a utility
patent, an inventor must file an application with the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO).207
Prior to 1980, patent protection was not available for "living" sub-
196. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933).
197. Beier & Straus, supra note 194, at 15. Existing patent law, which was developed in the
nineteenth century is outdated because many potentially valuable biotechnology inventions are
either excluded or insufficiently protected by current patent law. Id.
198. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 17.
199. Id. at 16.
200. See id. at 385; Bent, supra note 27, at 27.
201. Beier & Straus, supra note 194, at 20. Another indication of this shift in policy is
evidenced by the fact that patent holders are generally having much greater success in the
federal court system in litigation arising from patent infringement. Id.
202. Biggart, supra note 11, at 5. A "utility" patent is one which is obtainable by inventors
when the subject matter of the invention is a "new or useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Biotechnology utility patents may be catego-
rized as product patents, for example, nutrient media, organisms, cultures, and by-products
thereof; process patents, for example, fermentation methods, cultivation methods, and synthe-
ses using enzymes; and use patents, for example, using a previously known substance for a new
purpose. I. COOPER, supra note 186, § 1.03.
203. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. § 103.
207. Id. § 111.
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ject matter such as microorganisms, cell lines and plants.2 °8 The United
States Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty209 changed
this view.210 It is now clear that tissue and cells that are manipulated
by scientists are patentable subject matter.211 Before a patent can be is-
sued, however, cells must be deposited in a recognized independent
depository.212
A significant requirement of patentability is that the invention be
developed through human intervention.213 Patents are not obtainable on
products of nature.214 Although a scientist, through the use of biotech-
nology, can transform human tissue and cells into a patentable inven-
tion,215 tissue sources, such as the plaintiff in Moore, cannot patent their
own unique tissue or cells.
Furthermore, sources that simply contribute tissue and cells to
scientists cannot be regarded as inventors.216 To be considered an inven-
tor, one must be the first to conceive of the idea.217 Because, however, it
is improbable that a source would even be aware of his or her tissue's
potentially useful characteristics, 21I nearly all sources could not be con-
sidered inventors.
208. Biggart, supra note 11, at 6.
209. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The Court ruled that a man-made genetically engineered micro-
organism which was capable of breaking down components of crude oil was patentable. Id. at
305.
210. The Court determined that the mere fact that the invention was a living organism did
not preclude the possibility of obtaining patent protection. Id. at 318.
211. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 71. The USPTO currently issues
patents on man-made organisms, cell lines and hybridomas on a routine basis. Biggart, supra
note 11, at 7.
212. In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1220-22 (Fed. Cir. 1985). A deposit is required to meet
the Patent Law Enablement Act, which is designed to allow the public to practice freely the
claimed invention when the patent expires, and to be able to improve upon the technology
during the seventeen-year period. Benson, Biotechnology Patent Pitfalls, 4 BIOTECHNOLOGY
118, 120 (1986). See supra note 194 and accompanying text for an explanation of the seven-
teen-year period.
213. Biggart, supra note 11, at 11.
214. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). The underlying
rationale involved is that naturally occurring products are available to the public free from
restrictions. Biggart, supra note 11, at 11.
215. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TIssuE, supra note 4, at 71. It is important to note that
biotechnology products which are identical to counterparts which exist naturally, such as mi-
croorganisms, cannot be patented. Biggart, supra note 11, at 11. But, hybridomas, recombi-
nant DNA and parts of cells, developed through genetic engineering are patentable, either as a
composition of matter or an article of manufacture. Id. Also, any novel processes, such as a
novel process for genetically engineering a cell and altering its DNA or a novel method for
tissue culture, can be the basis of a utility patent. Id.
216. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 71.
217. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
218. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 71.
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Thus, tissue sources, under existing patent law, could not patent
their own unameliorated tissue. Therefore, absent scientific intervention,
the uniqueness of the tissue is worthless to the source. This is an impor-
tant factor in determining the fair value of the tissue source's
contribution.
3. Rights granted to patent holders
A patent holder of a human tissue-derived biotechnology invention
holds legally protected intellectual property rights.219 The exclusive
rights granted through patents are considered personal property.22 ° The
patent holder enjoys an exclusive property right in the intangible subject
matter of an invention.221 It is important to distinguish that the actual
physical embodiment of the invention, such as a human cell line, is not
the subject matter of the patent; rather, the mental concept allowing for
its creation is the protected property.222 Because, however, a patent
grants an exclusive right to make, use and sell the invention, it implicitly
vests exclusive tangible property rights in all products derived from the
intangible subject matter of the invention.223
E. The Right to Informed Consent Does Not Advance All Interests
According to the majority in Moore v. Regents of the University of
California,224 individuals have the right to informed consent regarding
whether their tissue can be used commercially after its removal. 225 This
right, however, will not advance all of the competing interests.
The Moore court stated that it was very concerned with protecting
an individual's autonomy. 226 The right it developed, however, falls short
of granting such protection under at least four circumstances.
First, under the traditional doctrine of informed consent, doctors
may avoid liability if the doctors can prove that their patients would have
consented to the surgery even if they had disclosed all material informa-
tion.227 If the patient, fully informed, would have consented to the sur-
gery, the doctor's nondisclosure could not have caused the patient's
219. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. at 188.
223. These rights are assignable; therefore, inventors may transfer their rights through a
license. See 35 U.S.C. § 261.
224. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
225. Id. at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
226. Id. at 143, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
227. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972).
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injury. In Moore, Justice Broussard, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, and Justice Mosk, dissenting, disagree on how the court would re-
solve this situation. Justice Mosk believed that a doctor would be able to
avoid all liability unless a patient proved that he or she would not have
had the medically necessary surgery.228 Justice Broussard, on the other
hand, maintained that for there to be a breach of the right to informed
consent, patients need to establish only that they would not have con-
sented to the commercial use of their tissue, not that they would not have
had the surgery at all.229 According to Justice Broussard, tissue sources
could then prove that the doctor's failure to disclose information caused
them some type of compensable damage.230 The majority, however,
failed to address this issue. Thus, how courts would resolve this type of
situation is unclear.
Second, the Moore court was ambiguous regarding whether patients,
once fully informed of the potential commercial value of their tissue, can
consent only to surgery and not to the tissue's subsequent use. In virtu-
ally all cases concerning human tissue with potential commercial value,
the patient will have an insufferable disease so the choice to undergo sur-
gery will be a life or death decision.231 As a result, the patient invariably
wants the surgery, but he or she may not want the removed tissue to be
used to develop a cell line. The court's holding could be interpreted to
mean, once fully informed, a patient must decide between either: (1)
consenting to surgery and to the tissue's subsequent commercial use or
(2) not consenting to the surgery at all. If so, this infringes on the pa-
tient's interest in making autonomous medical decisions. For example, a
patient with a rare form of cancer may want to have the world's most
prominent doctor perform the surgery, yet that doctor may also desire to
use the removed tissue commercially. If the patient is unwilling to con-
sent to the tissue's commercial use, the patient would be forced to seek
another doctor. In contrast to the majority opinion, Justice Broussard's
position in this regard is clear. According to Justice Broussard, a patient
has the right, prior to surgery, to control the use of the tissue after its
228. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 179-80, 793 P.2d at 519, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
229. Id. at 152, 793 P.2d at 500, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
230. Id at 158, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
231. See, eg., id. at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (patient had leukemia).
Human tissue becomes therapeutically valuable due to a chance abnormality caused by cancer.
See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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removal.2 32 Accordingly, a patient could consent to surgical removal of
the tissue, but not to its commercial use.1
3
Third, according to the majority, if a doctor has no plans to use
commercially a patient's tissue at the time of the surgery, then the pa-
tient's interests have not been impaired.234 This would allow a doctor to
perform the surgery and later perform research on the tissue to deter-
mine whether it is unique and potentially valuable. If a doctor then uses
the tissue commercially, the tissue source would have no rights in the
tissue. Justice Broussard, however, would disagree with this proposition
because he contends that the doctor's fiduciary duty also encompasses
postoperative conduct.23 5
Finally, parties other than the patient's doctor, such as biotechnol-
ogy companies, unless they are joint venturers, do not owe a fiduciary
duty to the patient.2 36 As a result, such parties could commercially use a
source's tissue without liability.
Under these circumstances patients would be denied the right to de-
cide what should be done with their bodily tissue. Consequently, "the
existence of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty cause of action does not provide a
complete answer ' 237 and does not adequately protect individuals' privacy
rights.
The Moore court's right to informed consent will not advance the
biotechnology industry's interest in eliminating uncertainty. Conse-
quently, the interests of the federal government and the public in encour-
aging research and product development are hindered.
Uncertainty exists for doctors and biotechnology companies as to
their potential liability under each of the four circumstances, discussed
above, because: (1) when a reasonable person with an insufferable dis-
ease, if informed, would have consented to the surgery, but not to the
232. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 155, 793 P.2d at 502, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 169 (Broussard, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
233. See id at 158, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (patient can donate tissue and reserve right to approve how used).
234. Id. at 131, 793 P.2d at 484, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
235. See id. at 152, 793 P.2d at 500, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
236. See id. at 133-34, 793 P.2d at 486-87, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 53-54. In addition, according
to Justice Broussard, a patient may consent to the use of his or her tissue and reserve the right
decide how that tissue would be used. Id at 158, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). Accordingly, if another biotechnology company
misappropriated the tissue and used it in an unauthorized manner for its own economic gain,
there would not be a breach of a fiduciary duty and consequently no cause of action would be
available to vindicate the tissue source's rights. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
237. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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tissue's commercial use, it is unclear whether doctors would be liable for
nondisclosure of potential commercial gain; (2) when a patient is fully
informed of the tissue's potential commercial value, doctors are uncer-
tain as to whether consent to the surgery allows them to use the tissue
even though the patient is opposed to its commercial use; (3) when a
doctor discovers a tissue's potential value after surgery, there is disagree-
ment among the justices concerning whether a doctor breaches a fiduci-
ary duty by commercially using the tissue without the source's consent;
and (4) when biotechnology companies work in conjunction with doc-
tors, they are unsure whether they would be considered joint venturers
and therefore liable for any breach of a fiduciary duty by the doctors.
In addition, Justice Broussard believes that patients could grant
consent to commercial use of their tissue, and at the same time reserve
the right to disapprove the research projects for which their tissue would
be used. 38 If so, this creates uncertainty for biotechnology companies
because they would never be sure whether sources would approve their
proposed projects.
Finally, the Moore court left indeterminate whether interested par-
ties can compensate patients for consent to use their tissue commercially.
This becomes an important issue if patients are permitted to consent only
to the surgical removal of their tissue and not to its commercial use.239
Applying the principles of freedom of contract,' 4 there seems to be no
reason why parties could not make compensation arrangements. The
Moore court apparently failed to recognize how rare and potentially val-
uable certain tissue can be and that biotechnology companies working
jointly with doctors may be so interested in obtaining such tissue that
they would be willing to pay for it. It is apparent, however, that the
Moore court's motive for not expanding conversion liability was its oppo-
sition to allowing tissue sources to share profits.241 Nevertheless, the ma-
jority may have overlooked that the right to informed consent to
commercial use of tissue may create the possibility that interested parties
will contract for that right. Contracts between scientists and tissue
238. Id. at 158, 793 P.2d at 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
239. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
240. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 121, § 1.7. In the absence of definitive laws, the sale
of tissue is generally permissible, unless the sale would pose a threat to the public health.
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 9. Under the circumstances of biotechno-
logical use of human tissue, no law prohibits the sale of human tissue. Id.
241. Since body tissue is not property, it follows that tissue sources cannot share in the
profits from its commercial use. Shapiro, Who Profits from Selling Human Body Parts?, L.A.
Daily J., Aug. 23, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
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sources may be subject to unconscionability problems and threats of
rescission.242
As illustrated, it is very unclear how the California courts will re-
solve many types of situations involving the commercial use of human
tissue. The court in Moore wanted to eliminate uncertainties to protect
researchers from liability and to encourage research and product devel-
opment.243 The majority narrowly interpreted conversion law to achieve
its objectives. 2" Ironically, the Moore court's holding has not only failed
to resolve many uncertainties, but has created new ones. Consequently,
the interests of eliminating uncertainty and promoting research and.
product development are not advanced.
VI. DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS
RAISED BY THE COMMERCIAL USE OF HUMAN TISSUE
To resolve the many problems created by using a person's tissue
commercially, an appropriate balance of the competing interests must be
achieved. The individual's right in the disposition of his or her body
tissue must be protected. At the same time, however, any law designed
to protect that right must not discourage research and product develop-
ment, nor create public policy problems or legal uncertainties.
A. Compensation to Tissue Sources Will Advance Interests
Compensation to tissue sources for the right to use their tissue com-
mercially would advance several interests. Compensation would pre-
serve the individual's rights and avoid windfalls to researchers. More
importantly, compensation would provide incentive for potential sources
to allow their tissue to be used in the development of therapeutic
products.
Currently, a majority of states allows tissue donors legally to con-
tract to sell parts of their bodies.245 In addition, although the National
Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA)246 prohibits the sale of organs
through interstate commerce,247 that prohibition does not apply to sales
of human tissue for research, commercial or other nontransplantation
242. See infra notes 300-58 and accompanying text.
243. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143, 793 P.2d at 493-94, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
244. See id. at 151, 157-58, 793 P.2d at 499, 504, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 166, 171. It is difficult to
believe that a part of a person's body is not his or her property. In order to advance its
policies, the majority should have instead concluded that the tissue was property and that an
exception to conversion liability exists, such as abandonment.
245. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 75.
246. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (1988).
247. Id. § 274e.
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purposes.24
1. Compensation to sources will protect the interests of patients
The law must protect a patient's privacy and autonomy rights, in-
cluding the right to decide what will be done with his or her surgically
removed body tissue.249 In addition, sources have an interest in ob-
taining the economic value of their tissue.250 If sources are not compen-
sated for the commercial use of their tissue, they sacrifice part of their
self-determination and lose a prospective financial advantage.251 Conse-
quently, compensation for the right to use a person's tissue commercially
would preserve these interests.
2. Compensation to sources will avoid windfalls to researchers
Allowing researchers to profit from the use of a person's tissue with-
out compensation would permit them to realize an inequitable return on
their services and products. The profits obtained through the commer-
cial use of human tissue would not exist without the tissue source's con-
tribution. Compensating sources for their necessary contribution would
eliminate the potential windfall to biotechnology companies and
doctors.252
3. Compensation will advance product development
After Moore v. Regents of the University of California,53 it is uncer-
tain whether interested parties will have to compensate sources for con-
sent to use their tissue commercially.254 Patients in California now have
a right to informed consent for the commercial use of their tissue;255 ac-
cordingly, those willing to give up that right should be entitled to com-
pensation. As a result, payment may be necessary to motivate sources to
consent to transfer their rights.25 6 For example, blood donors have tradi-
tionally been motivated primarily by altruism. 2 7 However, when there
has been an insufficient supply by altruistic donors, payment to donors
248. OWNERSHIP OF HuMAN TIssuE, supra note 4, at 76.
249. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text; see also OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TIS-
SUE, supra note 4, at 16.
251. See Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the
Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rlv. 207, 227 n.99 (1986).
252. OWNERSHIP OF HuMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 124-25.
253. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
254. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
255. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 128-32, 793 P.2d at 483-85, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150-52.
256. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 118.
257. Id.
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increased the supply.258 Also, in the case of organ donations, patients are
dying because of the shortages of certain organs. 2 59 Payments for organs
would be virtually certain to increase the supply of organs for trans-
plant.26 Similarly, such payment to sources should advance research
and development of human tissue products because it would likely in-
crease the available supply of tissue.261
Payments to sources may be necessary especially because the devel-
opers, who commercially use the tissue, may realize tremendous prof-
its. 262 As Moore confirms, however, the tissue source who made those
profits possible may receive nothing. The prospect that researchers will
be gaining massive profits through the use of tissue may override many
sources' altruistic motivations for donating their tissue. Compensation
would overcome this by providing an economic incentive for patients to
consent to the use of their tissue.263
Providing impetus for consent is especially important because truly
unique tissue with potential therapeutic value is extremely rare.2  Un-
less another biotechnique can be used as an immediate alternative,265 fail-
ure to obtain the consent of even one potential source may result in a
significant detriment to the public health.
B. Problems Created by Compensating Tissue Sources
Allowing tissue sources to seek payment for their tissue on the open
market raises many concerns. Payments to tissue sources carry both eco-
nomic and policy implications. Allowing sources to negotiate freely for
their tissue's highest price may adversely affect all of the interested par-
ties, including the individual source.
258. Ia
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 118; Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in Biotechnical
Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 638
(1989).
262. The potential market for products obtained from Moore's tissue is approximately three
billion dollars. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
263. Comment, supra note 251, at 233.
264. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 56. Cases of true uniqueness are not
only few in number, but are difficult, if not impossible, to identify except by chance discovery.
Id. The condition that caused Moore's spleen to develop unique characteristics occurs in only
250 Americans per year. See supra note 130. In addition, only a small percentage of this
tissue will have the capability of developing into a cell line. See supra notes 52-56 and accom-
panying text.
265. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TissuE, supra note 4, at 56.
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1. Added costs of research and development
The United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) has stated that a central issue concerning payments to sources is
the added cost of research and development of therapeutic products.266
Two types of additional costs are associated with payments to sources:
(1) the actual compensation to sources, and (2) transaction costs, which
are the costs of administering a payment program.267 If tissue sources
can freely negotiate for the rights to their tissue, then a bidding war be-
tween companies for rare tissue could significantly increase the cost of
the tissue. According to the OTA, however, transaction costs "are likely
to dwarf the costs of actual payments to the sources. ' ' 268 These costs will
most likely be passed on to the public in the form of higher product
prices.
Transaction costs would be high because a number of cell lines from
different sources may be responsible for the creation of any single
commercial product.2 69 Since research and development takes many
years, 270 this would significantly increase the transaction costs involved
in tracking the origin of all the sources. 271 Furthermore, these costs
would be incurred regardless of the success of the research.272 Conse-
quently, transaction costs would significantly increase the price of com-
mercial products regardless of the benefit provided by the individual
source's tissue.
2. Delaying product development
Allowing sources to freely negotiate for the rights to their tissue
would cause delays in the commercial availability of therapeutic prod-
ucts. Due to the complex nature of biotechnology, sources may seek to
retain knowledgeable consultants, similar to stocks and bonds brokers, in
assessing the commercial value of their tissue.273 The resulting negotia-
tions would delay development, as well as further increase transaction
costs. These delays would retard the development of products that could
potentially cure many fatal diseases.
266. Id. at 115.
267. Id. at 116.
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
271. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 116.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 117.
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3. Conflict with encouraging research
If the price researchers pay for tissue is too high, biotechnological
research may be discouraged, 274 especially if the tissue is used solely for
research by scientists with no profit motive.275 For example, the price of
human tissue could become prohibitively high due to bidding wars be-
tween biotechnology companies. Researchers may instead concentrate
on developing alternative techniques to human tissue culture.27 6 Fur-
thermore, if sources can contract for the rights to their tissue, the en-
forceability of such contracts may be uncertain.2 77 The uncertainty
would dampen research and development.278 This undermines the pat-
ent goal of encouraging research. Consequently, discovery of new thera-
peutic products would be hindered also because of the resulting decrease
in dissemination of technical knowledge. 279
4. Ethical concerns
There is widespread moral repugnance to the idea of developing a
market in human tissue.280 Ethicists are concerned that a market in
human tissue unacceptably alters the meaning of the human body.28'
"The effect on human dignity of a marketplace in human body parts [is
274. See Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties. The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Prof-
its, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 179, 200 (1988).
275. For example, graduate students at universities typically perform research without a
profit motive. The traditional goals of scientific research are exclusively knowledge oriented
and not commercially motivated. Placing a monetary value on human tissue or cells in the
research context seems in direct conflict with these traditional policies. See supra notes 186-87
and accompanying text for a discussion of scientific research policies.
276. See supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of the advantages of
using human tissue cultures.
277. See infra note 300-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of contract law
problems.
278. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 143, 793 P.2d 479, 494, 271
Cal. Rptr. 146, 161 (1990).
279. See supra note 186. Because, under patent law deposit requirements, cells must be
made available in order to be used for research, see supra note 212 and accompanying text, a
decrease in these deposits may frustrate new discoveries.
280. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TissuE, supra note 4, at 117; Sherman, The Selling of Body
Parts, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 32, col. 2.
281. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 16. For example, Justice Arabian in
Moore stated:
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one's own body tissue
for profit. He entreats us to regard the human vessel-the single most venerated and
protected subject in any civilized society-as equal with the basest commercial com-
modity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the profane. He asks much.
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 148, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (Arabian, J., concurring).
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greatly feared] .... Many believe that if the body is to be considered
part of the basic dignity of human beings, then trade in human tissue
should be limited.283
5. Concerns for the individual
The prospect of financial gain could have an undue influence on pa-
tients. There is a concern that tissue sources may harm themselves in an
effort to realize a pecuniary gain.284 Tissue sources may expose them-
selves to unacceptable risks to profit from their tissue.285
Very often a patient's tissue is valuable because of a disease, such as
cancer. If tissue sources are negotiating for the highest price for their
tissue, they will be delaying their surgery. Attention to maximizing their
profit could distract them from the more important aspect of treating
their condition. Such a distraction could be life-threatening.
6. Contract law uncertainties
As previously discussed, to advance all of the interests involved, it
may be permissible and necessary to compensate tissue sources for the
rights to use commercially their tissue.286 In fact, the right to informed
consent may be a right for which parties can contract, 287 or possibly
Congress or a state legislature may intervene by creating a free market in
human tissue.288
Examination of the application of traditional contract law doctrines
to possible tissue contracts reveals several dilemmas. During the devel-
opment of common-law principles, recent advances in biotechnology
were unimaginable. The parties would be contracting for unique subject
matter under exceptional circumstances. Consequently, an unrestricted
right to contract for consent would create additional legal uncertainties
due to the lack of relevant law in this area. Uncertainty about how a
court would resolve a dispute between the parties to a tissue contract
could discourage the development of human tissue-derived therapeutic
282. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 149, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (Arabian, .,
concurring).
283. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 13; Sherman, supra note 280, at 32.
284. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 11.
285. Id.
286. See supra notes 245-65 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
288. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 16.
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products.289 This is a result the Moore majority had hoped to avoid.290
Before doctors and biotechnology companies attempt to draft a tis-
sue consent contract, they must consider (1) whether the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.), which governs commercial transactions,
including contracts for the sale of goods, should apply to sales of tissue;
and (2) how contracts between sources and research companies should be
drafted to avoid enforceability problems. Although a cleverly drafted
contract can arguably avoid uncertainties,291 under these unique circum-
stances that may not be the case.
a applicability of the U. C. C.
The provisions of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code-
Sales292 apply to "transactions in goods." '293  If the sale of tissue is
treated as a sale of goods, then the U.C.C. should apply. However, if the
courts characterize the transfer of human tissue as a service,294 then the
U.C.C. will not apply.
An analogy can be drawn to the sale of blood and semen. States
allow the sale of blood or semen in amounts which are non-vital. 295 State
laws usually treat these as transfers of services rather than as sales of
289. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61. One commen-
tator has stated that "[u]ncertainty is an ubiquitous feature of biotechnology licensing. Almost
every provision is touched by this uncertainty.... Reducing this uncertainty is desirable."
Schlicher, supra note 171, at 284.
290. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 143, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
291. To protect itself against contract enforceability problems, a biotechnology company
should take several steps during contract formation with a tissue source. First, the company
should both make a full disclosure of all known facts relating to potential value of the tissue
and acknowledge that the tissue may be more valuable than anticipated. Second, the company
should have the source expressly agree, in light of this full disclosure, to relinquish all rights in
the tissue, even in the event that some previously unknown value is discovered. The contract
should also state that the compensation includes payment for possible unforeseen value.
Third, the contract should address the form of consideration, for example, a lump sum pay-
ment or a royalty arrangement. A compensation scheme which accounts for variable values of
derivative products, however, may provide more protection against future claims.
Nonetheless, it may be possible for a biotechnology company to completely avoid con-
tracting with a source. A company may use a source's cell line only for research and not as
part of the commercial production process. Once researchers discover the genetic properties
responsible for the establishment of a cell line and its by-products, a company could use re-
combinant DNA techniques to synthesize that particular gene sequence. The recombinant
form can be used for commercial production instead of the source's actual cells. Therefore, the
commercial products would not be directly obtained from the source's tissue.
292. U.C.C. § 2-101 (1989).
293. Id. § 2-102.
294. Courts usually determine whether a transaction is a sale of goods or a service. Trian-
gle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1979).
295. Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. Rav. 1182, 1193 (1974).
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goods.2 96 The main policy reason for characterizing these transactions as
services is to avoid products liability under either common law or the
U.C.C. implied warranty provisions.297 In deciding whether to treat the
transfer of tissue as a sale of goods or as a service, a court may look to
state and federal laws which govern transactions involving blood and
semen.
Nonetheless, tissue that is used as raw material for commercial
products, arguably, is distinguishable from blood and semen in both form
and substance. Blood and semen are replenishable, whereas tissue, such
as a spleen, is not. One test used to determine whether a transaction is
one in goods or services is whether the "predominant factor" is a sale,
"with labor incidentally involved," or instead, the rendering of a service,
"with goods incidentally involved. ' 298 Notwithstanding this distinction,
the U.C.C. should not apply because the tissue contract should be viewed
as involving intangible rights and not tangible goods. This is because
under Moore, the right involved is based not on a tangible property right
in the tissue, but on an intangible right in informed decision-making. As
a result, the contract involves compensation for one's consent and not a
sale of a good. Since in such a case no "transaction in goods" is involved,
the U.C.C. should not apply to the contract.299
296. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 76.
297. Id.
298. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974).
299. If the U.C.C. applies to tissue contracts, then U.C.C. warranties may be applicable.
The U.C.C. provides two implied warranties. The implied warranty of merchantability re-
quires goods to be of fair average quality, within the seller's description, and fit for the good's
ordinary purpose. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1989). The implied warranty of fitness requires goods to be
suitable for the buyer's particular purpose to the extent that the seller knows this purpose. Id.
§ 2-315. Liability for breach of warranties is based on strict liability and not negligence. See
id. §§ 2-314, 2-315. As a result, even careful examination of the tissue for contamination or
genetic flaw would not relieve the providing entity from liability. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN
TISSUE, supra note 4, at 77.
The implied warranty of merchantability applies only to merchants. See U.C.C. § 2-314
comment 3. A merchant is a person who deals in goods of the kind involved in the transac-
tion. Id. § 2-104. If a tissue market is created, a middleman may contract with a tissue source
and then sell the tissue to a biotechnology company. Such a middleman may be considered a
merchant. See id.; OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 77. Although the war-
ranty may apply to middlemen, it would not apply to the actual tissue source because sources
would not generally be in the business of selling tissue.
In contrast, the warranty of fitness, applies not only to merchants, but also to occasional
sellers. U.C.C. § 2-315 comment 4. Consequently, this warranty may apply to the tissue
source. Upon learning of the prospect of commercial gain, a tissue source may not disclose
certain medical or family history which would reveal that the tissue was not suitable for the
buyer's purpose. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 104. If the tissue's
derivative products cause injury, the tissue source may be held strictly liable.
Finally, under the U.C.C., specific performance is a possible remedy if goods are unique
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b. contract enforceability pitfalls
When drafting contracts with tissue sources, biotechnology compa-
nies should be aware of potential problems in enforcing these contracts.
Contracts may be subject to claims of unconscionability or rescission.
Both doctrines are somewhat related, 3°° but apply in slightly different
contexts. Unconscionability is used as a defense to the enforcement of a
contract, or to its unconscionable terms.3" 1 Therefore, problems arise
before the transaction occurs. Rescission issues apply to situations where
a party wants to avoid an initially valid contract.3 2  A tissue source who
has already relinquished his or her tissue may attempt to rescind the
contract and make a claim under quasi-contract. 30 3 Damages in quasi-
contract are measured as the reasonable value of the benefit received.3°
Under quasi-contract, tissue sources may be able to recover profits de-
rived from their tissue.30 5
i. unconscionability
Section 2-302 of the U.C.C. covers unconscionability. 30 6 Although
or where monetary damages are inadequate. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1989). Since the tissue in-
volved would be unique and the profit potential highly speculative, specific performance
should be an appropriate remedy for biotechnology companies to compel performance of a
contract. At least one court, however, refused to force a person to donate bone marrow, even
though he had initially agreed. McFall v. Shrimp, Case No. 78-17711 (Pa. filed July 26, 1978)
("forcible extraction of living body tissues causes revulsion to the judicial mind"). A court's
repugnance to forced donations may apply with equal force to a repudiated contract for tissue.
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 77.
300. To avoid a contract obligation due to mistake, there must be a showing that enforcing
the contract would be "unconscionable." See, e.g., Boise Junior College Dist. v. Mattefs Con-
str. Co., 92 Idaho 757, 450 P.2d 604 (1969) (enforcement of contract pursuant to terms of bid
would be unconscionable because contractor mistakenly failed to include sub-bid).
301. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 10.7 (1973).
302. G. PALMER, MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 13 (1962) [hereinafter G. PALMER,
MISTAKE].
303. Id. at 38. Quasi-contract refers to an implied-in-law contract that requires restitution
to the plaintiff of some benefit that the defendant has received, but in equity and good con-
science belongs to the plaintiff. D. DOBBS, supra note 301, § 4.2.
304. Kossian v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 647, 651, 62 Cal. Rptr. 225, 227
(1967); McCaffrey v. Cronin, 140 Cal. App. 2d 528, 534-35, 295 P.2d 587, 591 (1956); DeRo-
sier v. Vierra, 109 Cal. App. 2d 291, 294, 240 P.2d 660, 662 (1952); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1621
(West 1985); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 121, § 2.20.
305. See 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.12 (1978) [hereinafter G. PALMER,
RESTITrrTIoN].
306. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1989). The section provides in part:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
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technically the U.C.C. only covers "transactions in goods,"307 section 2-.
302 has been applied by analogy to many types of contracts.308 Further-
more, the unconscionability section of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts is based on section 2-302 of the U.C.C.30 9  Therefore, irrespective
of whether the U.C.C. would technically apply to tissue contracts, the
unconscionability terms embodied in section 2-302 should apply.
Commentators have often stated that the term "unconscionability"
is incapable of definition. 310  The basic test for unconscionability is
"whether, in the light of the general commercial background and com-
mercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract. 311 Unconscionability can be estab-
lished without showing fraud, serious misconduct, misrepresentation, du-
ress or undue influence.312
A potential problem with tissue right contracts may be that a source
may decide that the initially agreed-upon consideration is inadequate.
This may result if the source at the time of entering into the contract was
not fully aware of the tissue's potential value. Traditionally, inadequacy
of consideration alone was not grounds for granting equitable relief un-
less the inadequacy is such that it "shocks the conscience" of the
court.
3 13
Although inadequacy of consideration alone is generally not enough
Id.
307. Id. § 2-102.
308. Section 1670.5 of the California Civil Code, which embodies section 2-302 of the
U.C.C., applies to contracts in general and is not limited to sale of goods. See CAL. Cim. CODE
§ 1670.5 (West 1985); see also Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171
Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981) (contract to promote concert tour); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381
Mass. 284, 408 N.E.2d 1370 (1980) (franchise agreement); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson,
50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967) (real estate brokerage contract).
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 208 reporter's note (1981).
310. See D. DOBBS, supra note 301, § 10.7; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 121,
§ 4.28 (Professor Farnsworth comments that term's incapability of precise definition is a
source of both strength and weakness).
311. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1.
312. See D. DOBBS, supra note 301, § 10.7; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 121, § 4.27; 4 J.
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA § 1405a (5th ed. 1941).
313. See Coles v. Trecothick, 32 Eng. Rep. 592, 597 (1804). In one case, a twenty percent
interest in property was given in return for a total consideration of $12,225. Marks v. Gates,
154 F. 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1907). When the property acquired ultimately was worth over
$750,000, the court denied enforcement of the contract because the inadequacy of considera-
tion was "so gross as to render the contract unconscionable." Id. at 483. Similarly, if a source
promises to grant a company the rights to his or her tissue for consideration which is substan-
tially less than its commercial value, the source may assert that the contract is unconscionable.
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to make a contract unconscionable, at least one court has recognized that
unconscionability includes "an absence of meaningful choice on the part
of one of the parties... [and] unreasonably favorable [contract terms] to
the other party." '14  When a person lacks education he or she is not
afforded an opportunity to understand the contract terms and therefore
make a "meaningful choice." ' A tissue source will almost always lack
the necessary education to make a meaningful decision since the technol-
ogy involved in transforming tissue into commercial products is ex-
tremely sophisticated. 16 Furthermore, in a majority of cases, the tissue
is valuable because the patient is suffering from a disease such as cancer.
Often the tissue source will be dying and will require immediate surgery.
Consequently, tissue sources may argue their lack of knowledge of so-
phisticated biotechnology coupled with time constraints when they made
their decision created an "absence of meaningful choice" that resulted in
"unreasonably favorable" contract terms for the company.
In determining whether a contract is unconscionable the relation-
ship between the parties is also significant. The confidential relationship
between sister and brother coupled with the gross inadequacy of price
constituted unconscionability for a land sale contract.3 1 7 Similarly, a
court may emphasize the fiduciary relationship between a doctor and pa-
tient. Since the biotechnology companies are often joint venturers with
the doctors, this relationship can also make biotechnology companies
liable. 1 8
A biotechnology company may defend itself from an unconsciona-
bility claim by asserting that the fairness of the contract is to be judged at
the time the contract was made. 19 It may argue that the value of the
tissue was determined fairly at the time the contract was made, and
therefore subsequent developments are irrelevant. Even though courts
have rejected this argument,3 20 a company would have an opportunity to
314. Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (retail
installment sales contract which reserved right to repossess all items ever purchased from seller
for which buyer still owed money). The terms "substantive unconscionability" and "proce-
dural unconscionability" have been used to refer to "unreasonably favorable" contract terms
and "absence of meaningful choice" in the bargaining process, respectively. See Leff, Uncon-
scionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
315. Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
316. See supra notes 39-93 and accompanying text.
317. Jackson v. Seymour, 193 Va. 735, 739, 71 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1952).
318. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 133-34, 793 P.2d at 487-88, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55.
319. U.C.C. § 2-302(1); see also Bradford v. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1249,
1255 (10th Cir.) ("subsequent increase in price did not make contract unconscionable"), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1976).
320. See, eg., Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., 58
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present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect. 3 2 1 A
biotechnology company should stress that the initially agreed-upon con-
sideration is not unfair in light of the labor, investment costs and as-
sumption of risk which it incurred. Furthermore, such a company
should emphasize that the great public interest in developing new thera-
peutic products is a significant factor against rendering the contract
unconscionable.
I. rescission
Another related contractual problem is whether a source could re-
scind an executed tissue contract and sue in quasi-contract. 322 There are
several theories upon which a court may grant rescission of a contract in
this context.323 When a contracting party has knowledge of facts affect-
ing the value of the transaction and does not disclose those facts to the
innocent party, the innocent party may be able to rescind the
transaction.324
Because of the fiduciary relationship between a patient and doc-
tor, 321 it may not be difficult for a tissue source to establish grounds for
rescission. Even when no fiduciary relationship exists, however, a party
may be able to rescind a contract if one party made an innocent misrep-
resentation to the other or if the parties entered into the contract under
A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977) ("we cannot divorce entirely the events which occur
later").
321. U.C.C. § 2-302(2). The subsection states: "When it is claimed or appears to the court
that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making the determination." Id.
322. See Richardson Lumber Co. v. Hoey, 219 Mich. 643, 189 N.W. 923 (1922); E. FARNS-
woRTH, supra note 121, § 2.20; G. PALMER, MISTAKE, supra note 302, at 131; 2 G. PALMER,
REsTTTON, supra note 305, § 11.5(a). See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text for a
discussion of quasi-contract and recoverable damages.
323. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689(b)(1) (West 1985). A contract may be rescinded if con-
sent to the contract was given due to mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence. Id.
See also the Restatement (Second) of Contracts which provides that contracts are voidable on
the grounds of mistake, misrepresentation, abuse of a fiduciary relationship, duress, and undue
influence. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153, 164, 173, 175, 177 (1981).
324. See, e.g., Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff estab-
lished grounds for rescission of contract assigning patent rights), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860
(1978); Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941) (plaintiff established
grounds for rescission of contract for real property).
325. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 157. See supra note
149 for an explanation of fiduciary duty. Biotechnology companies involved in joint ventures
with doctors, when negotiating tissue contracts, may also be held to the same duty as doctors.
See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 133-34, 793 P.2d at 486-87, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153-54.
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some mistaken belief.326
(a) breach of fiduciary duty
A party may rescind a contract due to a breach of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship 327 that induces reliance to the prejudice of that
party.328 When a fiduciary relationship exists, and there is gross inade-
quacy in value of consideration, a court determining the validity of a
transaction views it with "the most scrutinizing jealousy. ' 329 Further-
more, when a fiduciary relationship exists the burden of proof is on the
party gaining the advantage to show that he or she acted with fairness.33°
This is the case even though the fiduciary did not have a fraudulent in-
tent.33' Therefore, it is possible for a party to make a statement which, in
326. See infra notes 334-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of establishing grounds
for rescission in the absence of a breach of a fiduciary duty.
327. "'A confidential relation exists between two persons when one has gained the confi-
dence of the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind. A confiden-
tial relation may exist [even though] there is no fiduciary relation .... .'" Vai v. Bank of
America, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 337-38, 364 P.2d 247, 252, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1961) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 comment b (1959)).
328. Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League, 49 Cal. App. 3d 365, 373, 122 Cal. Rptr.
732, 738 (1975); Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 129, 54 Cal. Rptr.
533, 539 (1966). In California such an action would be in constructive fraud. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1573 (West 1982). The elements of constructive fraud are (1) breach of a duty, (2)
without an actually fraudulent intent, (3) which allows a person at fault to gain an unfair
advantage, (4) by misleading a victim to his or her prejudice or anyone claiming under the
victim. Id.
329. Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 426, 71 P.2d 220, 228 (1937).
330. Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal. App. 2d 272, 290, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610, 622 (1966).
331. In re Arbuckle, 98 Cal. App. 2d 562, 568, 220 P.2d 950, 955 (1950); see also Agair,
Inc. v. Shaeffer, 232 Cal. App. 2d 513, 517, 42 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886 (1965); Efron v. Kalmano-
vitz, 226 Cal. App. 2d 546, 559-60, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157 (1964); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1573.
In Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiff was an eighteen year old Sears sales clerk
who, during his off hours, designed and constructed a "quick-release" ratchet wrench. 573
F.2d 976, 978 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978). The plaintiff submitted a prototype
of his invention to Sears. Id. Sears took steps to ascertain that the design was useful and that
the invention was, in fact, valuable. Id. at 978-79. Sears' lawyer contacted the plaintiff and
told him that based on his invention's limited patentability and cost of production, the inven-
tion was only worth $10,000. Id. at 979. Based on these representations, plaintiff entered into
a contract assigning all of his rights in the invention to Sears for a royalty of two cents per unit
up to a maximum of $10,000. Id. Nine months after the assignment, Sears sold over a half-
million wrenches and paid plaintiff his maximum royalty. Id. at 980. Within ten years, Sears
had sold over nineteen million wrenches and realized millions of dollars in profits. Id.
Four years after the assignment of his rights, the plaintiff sued Sears in an attempt to
rescind the contract. Id. at 980. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, finding that a confi-
dential relationship existed between the parties, held that Sears breached that relationship by
failing to disclose vital information concerning the product's value. Id. at 980, 984. In misrep-
resenting the invention's value, Sears was found to have overestimated the cost of production
to the plaintiff. See id. at 979-80. The court upheld the district court's finding that Sears
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view of the known facts, is warranted, but due to the relationship be-
tween the parties, may establish grounds for rescission when the state-
ment turns out to be false.
Based on this theory, a tissue source may seek to rescind a tissue
contract by arguing that the consideration was grossly inadequate. A
committed negligent misrepresentation concerning the invention's value, salability and public
acceptance. Id. at 986.
The facts of Roberts may be analogous to factual situations surrounding tissue contracts.
Assume a patient would go to a doctor concerning possible surgery. The doctor performs pre-
surgery tests on the patient's tissue and determines that the tissue is unique and commercially
valuable. See, eg., Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 125-26, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 198. This is
analogous to Roberts, whereby Sears determined that the plaintiff's wrench was valuable. The
doctor may currently be involved in a joint venture with a biotechnology company and may
then convey this information to his or her partner. The parties may decide to contract with
the patient for the rights to the tissue.
During negotiations with a tissue source, the biotechnology company or doctor may un-
derestimate or fail to disclose information relating to the potential therapeutic applications and
market potential of products derived from the tissue. Full information regarding the tissue's
potential value may be impossible to convey since the prospect is likely to be vague and specu-
lative at the time the tissue sample is obtained. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TissuE, supra
note 4, at 104. The source may be able to rescind the contract if he or she discovers, years after
transferring tissue rights to the company, that the exchange in value was inadequate. For
example, if a source assigns his or her tissue rights under a royalty agreement which is limited
by a maximum amount, that contract may be rescinded if there was any material misrepresen-
tations as to the tissue's potential value. Even if a royalty agreement is not limited by a maxi-
mum amount, a source may attempt to seek rescission if after the assignment the source
concludes that the tissue was worth a greater percentage then represented by the biotechnology
company. This can occur, if after the assignment, it becomes apparent that the biotechnology
company did not have to expend as much skill and labor in transforming the tissue into com-
mercial products as it represented during negotiations. In Moore, the plaintiff claims that
defendants did not need to invent or employ any extraordinary scientific methodology in order
to develop a cell line from his tissue and that the products derived therefrom were more a
result of his tissue's unique quality. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d
709, 716, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501 (1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793
P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146-(1990). The fact that a fiduciary relationship existed, combined
with other factors, such as the overestimation of research, development and production costs,
may establish grounds for rescission, as the overestimation of production costs did in Roberts.
Roberts, 573 F.2d at 979-80. This can occur even though the biotechnology company believed
its estimates to be true. See, eg., Hayter v. Fulmor, 92 Cal. App. 2d 392, 206 P.2d 1101 (1949)
(person may make misrepresentation even though that person believes representation to be
true).
Even if the biotechnology company claims that it acted in good faith, it would have the
burden of proving that the applications and market potential of the tissue were unforeseeable
at the time, and therefore, its projections were accurate at the time of disclosure. See supra
note 330 and accompanying text. For example, in Roberts, the defendant's argument that part
of the success of the "quick-release" ratchet was due to an unforeseeable boom in do-it-your-
self repairs was unsuccessful. See Roberts, 573 F.2d at 980. This can be an onerous burden
due to the lengthy and complex process of pharmaceutical product development. See supra
notes 167-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the industrial product development
process. Consequently, estimating costs and predicting unforecasted additional therapeutic
applications is extremely difficult.
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biotechnology company may defend against such a suit, however, by ar-
guing that its knowledge and skill resulted in the profitability of the tis-
sue.332 Conversely, a tissue source does not contribute any ideas or skill,
nor perform any work and cannot patent his own tissue.333 It is merely
by chance that a source's diseased tissue, which requires surgical re-
moval, has unique capabilities and, therefore, has potential value. While
inside the source, tissue is not only valueless, but is life threatening as
well. Furthermore, even after it is removed the tissue is of no value to
the source absent the knowledge, skill and labor of scientists.
(b) innocent misrepresentation and mistake
Alternative theories under which a tissue source may seek rescission
include innocent misrepresentation3 34 or mistake.33 5 These doctrines are
related; 336 however, under innocent misrepresentation a party must make
a false statement, whereas under mistake the defendant need not have
performed any misleading acts.337 It is more difficult to establish
332. In Roberts, however, the jury rejected the defendant's argument that the success of the
wrenches was a function of advertising. See Roberts, 573 F.2d at 980. Roberts is distinguish-
able from cases involving assignment of tissue rights, however, because in Roberts the plaintiff
conceived the idea and designed and constructed the subject matter of the invention. See Rob-
erts, 573 F.2d it 978.
333. Patentable subject matter requires human intervention. See supra note 213.
334. See Barrer v. Women's Nat'l Bank, 761 F.2d 752, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Reliance Fin.
Corp. v. Miller, 557 F.2d 674, 680 (9th Cir. 1977); Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, 610
(Alaska 1980); Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank v. Kuchman, 224 Cal. App. 2d 490, 495, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 806, 809 (1964). The essential elements of innocent misrepresentation are (1) a false
statement, (2) concerning a material fact, (3) that was relied upon (4) justifiably by the party
seeking recission of a contract. Barrer, 761 F.2d at 758; Cousineau, 613 P.2d at 612; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) & comment a.
335. Reliance Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d at 679; Wood v. Kalbaugh, 39 Cal. App. 3d 926, 930,
114 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1974); Worsham v. Pierce, 251 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971); Lenawee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 417 Mich. 17, 26, 331 N.W.2d 203, 208
(1982). The essential elements of mistake of fact are (1) a mistake (2) that goes to a basic
assumption on which the contract was made (3) that has a material effect on the agreed ex-
change of performances and (4) is not one of which the party bears the risk. Lenawee, 417
Mich. at 29-30, 331 N.W.2d at 209-10; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152.
336. Innocent misrepresentation is a type of mistake. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 224 Cal.
App. 2d at 495-96, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
337. See supra notes 334-35. It is unclear whether an innocent non-disclosure will qualify.
Under the Restatement, a person's non-disclosure of a fact is not treated as a misrepresentation
when it is not known that disclosure (1) is necessary to prevent a previous assertion from being
a misrepresentation or material, (2) would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic
assumption and non-disclosure amounts to failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing, (3) would correct a mistake as to the contents or effect of
a writing, or (4) where the other person is entitled to know the fact because of the existence of
a confidential relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161. Consequently,
following the Restatement if a person is totally innocent as to any cure which disclosure could
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grounds for rescission under a mistake theory than under an innocent
misrepresentation theory.338
(1) innocent misrepresentation
Under an innocent misrepresentation theory, a contract may be re-
scinded if the representation was "material, '339 even though it was made
innocently.34 The rationale for the rule is that one should not benefit at
the expense of another even though the false statement was made under
an honest belief of its truth.341
Under the standards of materiality, statements relating to the tis-
sue's value should be considered material since a reasonable person
would attach importance to such a consideration in deciding whether to
grant consent. Innocent misrepresentations relating to the value of land
and stocks have been held to be material. 342 By analogy, should a tissue
source assent to a particular compensation agreement under representa-
tions that the tissue was of a particular value, those representations
should be considered material if its actual value turns out to be signifi-
cantly more.
For a court to grant a source's request for rescission of a tissue con-
tract based on innocent misrepresentation, that source must also show
that the misrepresentation acted as an inducement.343 Inducement is
shown through actual reliance;344 and the source must also establish that
the reliance was justified.345
A biotechnology company may argue that a source should investi-
accomplish and is not in a confidential relationship with the other party, then non-disclosure of
a known fact will not qualify as a false statement.
338. Reliance Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d at 680.
339. A key requirement in establishing innocent misrepresentation is that the false state-
ment is material. A misrepresentation is material if it would likely induce a reasonable person
to assent to a transaction. See id.; Wood, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 930, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 676;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 comment c.
340. Barrer, 761 F.2d at 757. It has been stated that "'the good faith of the party who
procures the assent of another to the making of a contract by material misrepresentations is of
no moment."' Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 224 Cal. App. 2d at 497, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 810
(quoting Scott v. Delta Land & Water Co., 57 Cal. App. 320, 328, 207 P. 389, 392 (1922)).
341. See Barrer, 761 F.2d at 757; 1 G. PALMER, RESTITUTION, supra note 305, § 3.19.
342. See Cousineau, 613 P.2d at 612 (misrepresentation as to the amount of gravel on prop-
erty which reduced its value); Crocker-Anglo Nat' Bank, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 494-95, 36 Cal.
Rptr. at 809 (misrepresentation as to the value of stock).
343. See Barrer, 761 F.2d at 759; Reliance Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d at 680; Cousineau, 613 P.2d
at 612.
344. Barrer, 761 F.2d at 759. However, comment a of section 167 of the Restatement states
that this reliance need not be the sole or predominant factor influencing the decision. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 167 comment a.
345. Barrer, 761 F.2d at 758; see also supra note 334.
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gate, independently, facts concerning tissue value.346  This argument
would fail, however, because a biotechnology company has special skill
in an area which is necessary to the formation of the tissue source's
sound judgment. Therefore, the source's reliance on the company's as-
sertion with respect to the potential value of the tissue would be
justified. 4 7
(2) mistake
A tissue source may also rescind a contract under the theory of mis-
take. If a source enters into a contract with a biotechnology company,
transfers the tissue to the company, and later claims that there was a
"belief that was not in accord with the facts, ' 348 the contract may be
rescinded under the mistake doctrine.349 Mistake consists of unconscious
ignorance or forgetfulness of a material fact to the contract, or a belief in
the past or present existence of a material thing which does not, or has
not, existed. In order to allow for rescission, the mistake must also go
346. However, if a tissue source acts in good faith and according to reasonable standards of
fair dealing, failure to discover facts does not make reliance unjustified. Barber, 761 F.2d at
759 (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 172 (1981)). Section 169 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts may be even more applicable to situations involving tissue
contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 169 (applies when a party to the
contract has a special skill in the area).
347. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 169 comment d (when a person has
special skill in an area which is necessary to the formation of sound judgment, reliance on his
or her assertion with respect to the subject matter is justified).
348. Id. § 151.
349. See Hoey, 219 Mich. at 649-50, 189 N.W. at 925; see also supra note 335.
350. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1577 (West 1982). A distinction is often made between mutual and
unilateral mistake. A mistake is mutual if the mistaken assumption is shared by both parties.
D. DOBBS, supra note 301, § 11.3; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 121, § 9.3; G. PALMER,
MISTAKE, supra note 302, at 69. If only one party was mistaken as to a given fact underlying
the transaction, the mistake is unilateral. D. DOBBS, supra note 301, § 11.4; E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 121, § 9.3; G. PALMER, MISTAKE, supra note 302, at 62. Professor Palmer has
declared that "[a]lthough it is commonly said that mutual mistake is a prerequisite of rescis-
sion, this is not the case." 2 G. PALMER, RESTITUTION, supra note 305, § 12.1. In California,
neither section 1577 of the Civil Code nor section 1689, which govern mistake and rescission,
require that the mistake be mutual. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1577, 1689. Many cases in Cali-
fornia have granted rescission for a unilateral mistake. E.g., Architects & Contractors Esti-
mating Serv., Inc. v. Smith, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 211 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); Brunzell Constr.
Co. v. G.J. Weisbrod, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 2d 278, 285 P.2d 989 (1955); Forest Lawn Memorial
Park Ass'n v. De Jarnette, 79 Cal. App. 601, 250 P. 581 (1926). Also, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts changed its previous position and provides for rescission based on unilateral
mistake or when enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 153(a). Under the previous Restatement of Contracts, unilateral mis-
take allowed for rescission of a contract only if the other party had reason to know of the
mistake or caused the mistake. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1937). Professor Palmer
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to a basic assumption upon which the contract was made.3"' Once the
contract is rescinded,352 a source may have a claim in quasi-contract." 3
Researchers and biotechnology companies have two defenses to
claims of mistake. First, mistakes as to quality or value, or mistakes
about characteristics of the subject matter of the contract may not be
compensable.35 a In such cases courts rule that a contract can be re-
scinded only if there was a mistake in identity.355 Second, researchers
advocates that most cases concerning mistake can be dealt with without using the terms. G.
PALMER, MISTAKE, supra note 302, at 67.
351. Lenawee, 417 Mich. at 29, 331 N.W.2d at 209; RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 152.
352. Professor Palmer states that two elements are of central importance in determining
whether a mistake is sufficiently basic to warrant rescission: (1) the way the mistake influenced
the formation of the contract, especially the extent to which the mistake produced a discrep-
ancy between the actual and the supposed subject matter of the contract; and (2) the effect of
the mistake on the economic equivalence of the agreed exchange. 2 G. PALMER, RESTITU-
TION, supra note 305, § 12.2. Palmer suggests that the effect on the economic equivalent of
exchange is important because a reasonable degree of equivalence is expected in business trans-
actions. Id. Furthermore, Palmer declares that prevention of unjust enrichment is a principal
reason for giving relief for mistake. Id. (citing as examples Marker v. United States, 43 F.2d
457 (D.C. Idaho 1930); Worsham v. Pierce, 251 So. 2d 896 (Fla. App. 1971)). In the famous
case, Sherwood v. Walker, the plaintiff, a cow breeder, contracted to sell a purebred cow at a
price which was based on the cow's value for beef. 66 Mich. 568, 576, 33 N.W. 919, 923
(1887). The parties assumed that the cow was barren and could no longer reproduce. Id.
However, it turned out that the cow was pregnant at the time that the contract was made and
worth ten times more than the agreed price. Id. The court held that the plaintiff could avoid
the sale under the theory of mistake. The parties had reached a specific agreement at a speci-
fied price, without any misleading acts by the defendant, and the seller was allowed to rescind
the contract because the values of the exchange were grossly disproportionate. See Sherwood,
66 Mich. at 577-78, 33 N.W. at 923-24.
Applying the facts of Sherwood to a tissue contract, if a source agrees to transfer the rights
to his or her tissue under a particular compensation agreement and the parties were mistaken
as to the actual value of the tissue, then such a mistake may be deemed to go to a basic
assumption. See Lenawee, 417 Mich. at 29, 33 N.W.2d at 209. Such a mistake can occur if the
tissue's cells produce significantly more therapeutic proteins than anticipated. Consequently,
if the exchange in value was grossly disproportionate, a source may rescind the contract.
A defendant in a suit for rescission of a tissue contract may attempt to distinguish Sher-
wood by arguing that it was subsequent events, such as research and development, that gave
the tissue its increased value and that such value did not exist at the time the contract was
made. A court would then have to determine whether the tissue's newly discovered value was
inherent at the time of contracting or whether its value was solely due to biotechnological
development. In such a case the court should look at whether the tissue is truly unique in the
sense that only a small percentage of the population has tissue with such capabilities, or
whether it is the fact of discovery which was unique. See supra notes 57-62 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion concerning the rarity of tissue. If the tissue itself is not truly unique
then its subsequent value may be seen as being more the result of biotechnology than the tissue
itself.
353. See supra note 322.
354. 2 G. PALMER, RESTrTUTION, supra note 305, § 12.17.
355. Id. For example, in Wood v. Boynton, the plaintiff sold a stone for one dollar. 64 Wis.
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and biotechnology companies may argue that the tissue source assumed
the risk of uncertainty.3 5 6 A seller is said to assume the risk of mistake
where, for example, after the sale of land it is discovered that the land
contains valuable mineral deposits. 3 7 The defendant in a tissue contract
dispute can argue that the source assumed the risk of a mistake in the
tissue's value. In tissue contracts, however, the hidden potential value of
265, 268, 25 N.W. 42, 43 (1885). Both parties believed that the stone was topaz or some other
stone of nominal value; however, the stone was actually an uncut diamond worth $700. Id.
The plaintiff was not allowed to rescind the contract because there was no mistake as to iden-
tity. Id. at 271, 25 N.W. at 44.
Rescission was also denied on the same grounds in Costello v. Sykes, where stock was sold
at $136 a share when, unknown to the parties, due to a coverup of an embezzlement in the
books the stock was only worth $60 a share. 143 Minn. 109, 110-11, 172 N.W. 907, 908
(1919). The court stated that "a mistake relating merely to the attributes, quality, or value of
the subject of a sale does not warrant a rescission." Id. at 11, 172 N.W. at 908. Defendants
in tissue contract disputes could argue, using these cases as support, that a mistake in value
should not allow for rescission based on mistake.
Although the defendant in a tissue contract rescission case can argue that the mistake was
one of value and not identity, such an argument may not succeed. The Restatement of Con-
tracts used the facts of Wood as an example illustrating when a court should grant, not deny,
rescission. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 503 comment a, illustration 3 (1932). Further-
more, Professor Palmer suggests that the results in previous cases where rescission was denied
would be the opposite today because of the recognition of the principle of avoiding unjust
enrichment. See 2 G. PALMER, REsTrruTiON, supra note 305, § 12.17. In these instances,
unjust enrichment connotes that the transaction lacked economic equivalence. Id. § 12.2.
Palmer also notes, however, that even today there is often little or no reference to an unjust
factor. Id. (citing as example Reliance Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 557 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1977)). In
many cases where there would be unjust enrichment, courts stretch to characterize the mistake
as one in identity. Id. § 12.17. For example, in Sherwood it was held that because the cow was
pregnant it "was not in fact the animal" which was intended to be sold. Id. (citing Sherwood
v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887)). Ultimately, the court in Lenawee expressly
ruled that the Sherwood holding, with respect to the material or the collateral nature of a
mistake, is limited to its facts because such a distinction only impedes the analysis. Lenawee,
417 Mich. at 29, 331 N.W.2d at 209. Consequently, mere reliance on the fact that the mistake
was only one of value may not prove successful.
356. See, eg., Nester v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 69 Mich. 290, 37 N.W. 278 (1888)
(timber sold at lump sum price, amount of timber was in controversy during negotiation, buyer
held to have assumed risk of uncertainty). According to the Restatement:
A party bears the risk of a mistake when (a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement
of the parties, or (b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only
limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his
limited knowledge as sufficient, or (c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the
ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 154.
357. Id. § 154 comment a. Professor Palmer states that although putting the matter in
terms of assumption of risk has appeal, that appeal is deceptive. 2 G. PALMER, RESTITUTION,
supra note 305, § 12.5. "[A] decision that the risk on one party or the other is often merely
another way of stating the conclusion." Id. Palmer believes that there should not be a relieva-
ble mistake because the matter was not the basis of the bargain. G. PALMER, MISTAKE, supra
note 302, at 50. His opinion is influenced by the inherent uncertainty of the matter. Id.
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the tissue is the basis of the bargain.3 8
iii. summary of contract pitfalls
In summary, problems with tissue contracts may arise due to im-
proper valuation because the subject matter is inherently uncertain and
the knowledge of the parties may be incomplete.359 Rescission of tissue
contracts may be possible when there is a serious inequality in an agreed
exchange of values. Courts consider the nature of the misrepresentation
or mistake and surrounding circumstances-for example, whether there
is a fiduciary relationship between the parties. In addition, courts will
consider the nature in which a mistake interacts with the factor of unjust
enrichment 360 or possibly unconscionability. Whether a court grants re-
lief will often depend on policy considerations.36 1 As a result, decisions
in tissue contract cases could vary considerably.
VII. PROPOSAL
Developing an appropriate solution to the problems raised by the
commercial use of human tissue involves "complex policy decisions af-
fecting all society. ' 362 As all of the justices advanced in Moore v. Regents
358. The plaintiff, tissue source, may distinguish the mineral discovery case because the
existence of minerals was totally unforeseen and therefore not the basis of the bargain. See
Lenawee, 417 Mich. at 29, 331 N.W.2d at 209; G. PALMER, MISTAKE, supra note 302, at 50.
In a tissue contract the tissue's potential value is the basis of the bargain. The defendant may
rebut that, due to the complex nature of biotechnology, the potential value of the tissue is
inherently uncertain, and therefore, the tissue source assumed the risk of a mistake. See supra
notes 39-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of tissue culture technology.
This may lead to the issue of whether the parties' bargain included compensation for
unforeseen therapeutic applications. In deciding this issue, an analogy can be drawn to per-
sonal injury release cases. In these cases, the injured party attempts to avoid a release by
claiming the parties were mistaken as to the extent of the injuries. See, e.g., Myers v. Fecker
Co., 312 Minn. 469, 252 N.W.2d 595 (1977). To prevail, the plaintiff must show that the
parties shared the basic assumption that the release did not include compensation for unknown
injuries. Id. at 476, 252 N.W.2d at 600. Courts will look to the amount of the settlement
compared to the magnitude of the known injuries to determine what was the basic assumption.
See, e.g., Reede v. Treat, 62 Ill. App. 2d 120, 210 N.E.2d 833 (1965); Boccarossa v. Watkins,
112 R.I. 551, 313 A.2d 135 (1973). If the amount received in the settlement was close to the
value for known injuries, it suggests that the release did not include compensation for unfore-
seen injuries and rescission may be granted. See Reede, 62 Ill. App. 2d at 132, 210 N.E.2d at
839. In deciding whether a source was compensated for unforeseen value a court may judge
whether or not the payment received under the contract was close to the tissue potential value
that was proposed at the time of the bargain.
359. See 2 G. PALMER, REsTITuTION, supra note 305, § 12.3.
360. Id. § 12.2.
361. Id. § 12.5.
362. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 147, 793 P.2d 479, 496, 271 Cal,
Rptr. 146, 163 (1990).
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of the University of California,363 the legislature should make such com-
plex policy decisions because legislators have the ability to gather empiri-
cal evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and hold hearings. 3 Congress
or a state legislature may decide that the right to informed consent does
not provide adequate protection to the autonomy and privacy rights of
patients.365 The government may also decide that it cannot condone the
windfalls researchers would receive if they did not compensate their tis-
sue sources.
366
There are several actions Congress or state legislatures may take,
but any action must be consistent with governmental policies reflected in
current federal patent laws. 367 Legislation may be enacted: (1) prohibit-
ing commercialization of human tissue;368 (2) allowing commercializa-
tion, but prohibiting compensation to tissue sources;3 69 or (3) allowing
both commercialization and compensation to tissue sources.37°
Passing legislation prohibiting commercialization would be both a
detriment to the public, since life-saving therapeutic products would not
become available, and a detriment to the economy, since it would reduce
investment activity in biotechnology. Any commercialization of human
tissue should be accompanied by a system of compensation to tissue
sources. Absent receipt of some compensation, tissue sources may be
reluctant to consent to commercial use of their tissue. Consequently, any
legislation enacted should allow both commercialization and compensa-
tion to sources.
A Uniform Tissue Source Compensation Act (the Proposed Act)
should be enacted to allow commercialization of biotechnology products
and compensate tissue sources, while avoiding the problems that would
result if sources could freely negotiate tissue rights contracts. This com-
pensation system would pay sources with unique tissue on a flat fee ba-
sis, 37 1 including the costs of surgery, regardless of whether subsequent
research and development is successful. Once paid, sources would relin-
quish all present and future rights in their tissue. The Proposed Act
363. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
364. Id. at 147, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
365. See supra notes 224-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the right to
informed consent inadequately protects individuals' rights.
366. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 124-25.
367. See supra notes 191-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of patent law policy.
368. See OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 4, at 15-19.
369. See id.
370. See id.
371. The fee should be somewhere between $10,000 and $20,000.
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would also exempt tissue sources from any possible liability, such as
strict products liability.
Flat fee compensation is a more appropriate system than awarding
sources a fixed percentage of profits realized from the final product for
several reasons. 372 First, since tissue sources do not have property rights
in either their surgically removed tissue373 or the resulting cell line,374 it
follows that sources should not share profits. 375 Second, it is contrary to
patent law to allow sources, who do not contribute any ideas, skill or
labor to product development, to share profits because they cannot be
considered inventors.3 76 Third, tissue sources should not share profits
because it is the highly technical skill and labor of the scientist that trans-
form the diseased tissue into patentable subject matter. Furthermore,
sources do not share investment costs and risks associated with industrial
product development.
The Proposed Act would reduce costs. Uniform compensation
would eliminate the need for complex negotiations involving brokers and
attorneys. Also, since sources are paid regardless of whether their tissue
yields a commercial product, this approach minimizes record-keeping
and eliminates the need for tracking.3 77 Even if the tissue does not result
in the production of a commercial product, the biotechnology company
would still have derived useful research value from the tissue's use. Ac-
cordingly, the Proposed Act would minimize costs and delays in research
and development.378
As a result of these benefits, the Proposed Act protects the interests
of the tissue sources and biotechnology companies in other ways as well.
The rights of sources are vindicated by compensation for their consent to
commercial use of their tissue. The biotechnology industry's interest
would be served because the system would allow companies to fix prod-
372. One author, prior to the California Supreme Court's ruling in Moore, proposed legisla-
tion based on a fixed-rate of profit sharing. Danforth, supra note 274, at 199-200.
373. The sources are only being compensated for their consent, not their property.
374. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154. In addition to this
legal distinction, the cells making up the patented cell line also are factually distinct from those
taken from a source's body. This is because the cells that give rise to a continuous cell line
undergo a genetic alteration called "transformation." R. FRESHNEY, supra note 39, at 9. The
specific cells that ultimately gave rise to the cell line are not genetically the same as the
source's and were not present initially in the original tissue sample. Id. For these reasons, as
well, the patented cell line cannot be the source's property. Moore, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 141 &
n.35, 793 P.2d at 492 & n.35, 271 Cal Rptr. at 159 & n.35.
375. See Shapiro, supra note 241, at 7, col. 1.
376. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
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uct development costs without having to share the profits, and without
the threat of contract enforceability problems.
37 9
Finally, the Proposed Act would advance public interest by elimi-
nating delays and disincentives to research and development of valuable
therapeutic products. Additionally, because the system would minimize
transaction costs, the cost of the commercial products to the public
would not be prohibitively high. Thus, the Proposed Act would assure
availability of biotechnology products to the general public.
Although the source's contribution is necessary to product develop-
ment, flat fee compensation is fair because the tissue has value only due
to a chance abnormality. The source benefits from the surgery. It is the
work of scientists that transforms the tissue into valuable therapeutic
products. Flat fee compensation ensures payment to sources regardless
of the commercial success of the project. 38 0 The tissue source's relative
contribution, unique tissue discovered by chance, does not merit a share
of the profits. The Proposed Act will compensate tissue sources fairly,
particularly in light of the tremendous public interest involved in making
the therapeutic products available and affordable. Any "personal sacri-
fice involved is part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the
welfare of the public.",
31'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The development of powerful biotechnology techniques have made
it possible to transform diseased human tissue into extremely valuable
commercial products. These products are valuable to both the biotech-
nology industry, in the form of profits, and the public, in the form of
therapeutic products. Recognition of the right to informed consent to
commercial use of a patient's surgically removed tissue does not advance
all of the interests involved and may even force entities to contract for
these rights.
If compensation is disproportionate to the exchange in tissue value,
under current laws, contract enforceability problems may arise. Compa-
nies will be discouraged from engaging in human tissue product develop-
379. See supra notes 300-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of contract enforceabil-
ity problems.
380. This is advantageous since the potential success of any product development project is
highly speculative. See supra note 167. Therefore, under a licensing agreement, whereby pa-
tients shared profits, a source most likely would either end up with nothing or, even if product
development was successful, profits might not be realized until after the death of the source.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text for a discussion of the length of time involved in the
industrial product development process.
381. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
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ment. If sources are allowed to negotiate freely for the rights to their
tissue, costs may become prohibitively high. Such results hinder ad-
vancement of patent law policy, which encourages research and dissemi-
nation of knowledge. Consequently, therapeutic products would not be
developed or would become available only at increased costs. Ulti-
mately, the public would suffer because these products carry great poten-
tial to treat many human diseases, possibly even AIDS.
Biotechnology industry researchers believe that new laws are needed
to clarify the legal issues.382 The problems created by the commercial
use of human tissue, however, cannot be resolved adequately by the
courts. Although courts often decide difficult legal issues even when they
require a choice between competing social or economic policies, "[t]he
difference here.., lies in the nature of the conflicting moral, philosophi-
cal and even religious values at stake, and in the profound implications"
of recognizing rights in human tissue.383 "Where then shall a complete
resolution be found? Clearly, the Legislature... is the proper deliberate
forum." 384
The legislature should create a Uniform Tissue Source Compensa-
tion Act. Such an act would eliminate many of the problems associated
with payment to sources. Sources would be paid a flat fee, regardless of
commercial success. The system would serve the interests of the individ-
ual and at the same time reduce transaction costs by eliminating the need
for complex negotiations and tracking of sources. Biotechnology compa-
nies could fix their costs without the threat of future contract litigation.
Such a compensation system is fair because valuing a source's con-
tribution must be analyzed in light of the scientific technologies, patent
laws and policies, and industrial product development. Sources generally
do not contribute any ideas, skill, labor or investment capital to develop-
ment projects. Due to the high degree of technical skill and labor in-
volved in developing therapeutic products and creating a patentable
subject matter, along with extraordinary investment costs, limiting a
source's compensation does not result in a windfall to biotechnology
companies. Most importantly, a uniform compensation system fosters
the development of human tissue products and their availability at re-
382. Hamilton, Who Told You Could Sell My Spleen, Bus. WK., Apr. 23, 1990, at 38.
383. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 149, 793 P.2d at 498, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (Arabian, J.,
concurring).
384. Id. (Arabian, J., concurring).
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duced costs. As a result, such a system balances the interests of the indi-
vidual source, the biotechnology industry and the public.
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